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I. INTRODUCTION
Argentina's constitution dates back to 1853 and has rarely
been formally suspended. Constitutionalism has nevertheless
almost never existed in Argentina, as virtually each government's
power exceeded the strictures of the constitution. This article
takes a holistic approach, combining historical, political, and legal
analyses in examining the reasons why democracy, and especially
constitutionalism and the rule of law, have failed in Argentina.
Argentina has an extremely centralized system where the
president is nearly omnipotent. This article first posits that
Argentine "hyperpresidentialism" is incompatible with genuine
constitutionalism, which is defined as a system of fundamental
laws, rights, and principles limiting governmental power in order
to avoid the abuses stemming from unchecked authority. The
article subsequently focuses closely on how constitutionalism and
the rule of law fared during several historical periods in Argentine
history, ranging from independence in 1816 until 2007. First,
until the military coup of 1930, a gradual process of democratiza-
tion was hampered by electoral fraud, corruption, and occasional
repression. Second, from 1930 to 1983, Argentina was highly
unstable due to a series of military coups. Successive govern-
ments drastically repressed political opponents and ignored legal
limits on executive power. A fascist military junta eventually
purged over 30,000 "subversives" between 1975 and 1981. But
dissidents were also severely repressed by Juan Per6n, a charis-
matic populist who governed Argentina, pursuant to three presi-
dential elections, between 1946 and 1955 until the military
overthrew him and forced him into exile, and between his return
to Argentina in 1973 until his death in 1974. An analysis of
Per6n's populism will also demonstrate why the power of a demo-
cratic majority must be limited by constitutional minority rights.
Third, after military rule ended in 1983, the return of democracy
heralded the heyday of constitutionalism and the rule of law in
Argentina. A consensus condemned the abuses of past authorita-
rian regimes and led moderate president Rauil Alfonsin, other poli-
ticians, and the general public to focus on the importance of basic
democratic principles and human rights. The rule of law
progressed with the prosecution of past human rights abuses com-
mitted by fascist military officers and their opponents in the radi-
cal leftist guerrilla movement. Fourth, following his presidential
election in 1989, Peronist Carlos Menem undid many of the
advances of the democratic transition by packing the courts with
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loyalists and engaging in widespread corruption. Menem imple-
mented sweeping neoliberal economic reforms in a radical and cor-
rupt manner that contributed to a catastrophic economic crisis
that pauperized millions of people. In 2001, mass protests caused
by the economic crisis eventually led to the resignation of Fer-
nando De la Rfia, who had succeeded Menem as president. Fifth,
Nestor Kirchner, the first true populist president to rule the coun-
try since Per6n, mastered the Peronists' ability to rally broad pop-
ular support while maximizing presidential power to the
detriment of democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law
during his tenure from 2003 until 2007.
The salient theme throughout these periods is that unchecked
presidential power has facilitated gross abuses of authority, rang-
ing from corruption to violent repression of political opponents.
The volatile political situation and the rise of extremist authorita-
rian regimes were also not suitable to the development of constitu-
tionalism. Moreover, hyperpresidentialism may have contributed
to instability by inciting a president's opponents to overthrow him
by military force or constrain him to resign under intense public
pressure when he failed to resolve a political or economic crisis
despite his quasi-unilateral control over government.
Populism is another abiding issue that has affected democ-
racy and constitutionalism throughout Argentine history. Popu-
lism is a complex phenomenon that may be defined as a political
movement seeking to defend the rights and interests of the com-
mon people, which may emerge from the grassroots but may also
be spearheaded by politicians, partly for self-interest. Populism
became wholly incarnated in Per6n's pro-working class regimes
(1946-55, 1973-74), which enjoyed majoritarian support despite
being neither democratic nor constitutional. In the 1980s, ele-
ments of populism also materialized in the mass demonstrations
pressuring the transitional democratic government to prosecute
military officers' past human rights abuses. More recently, since
the late 1990s, populism has animated mass protests against
neoliberal economic reforms that have challenged the social con-
tract of what was principally a socialist state, and whose failure
contributed to the sharp economic crisis that significantly impov-
erished the Argentine working class.
411
412 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:3
II. ARGENTINE HYPERPRESIDENTIALISM VERSUS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAL OF
LIMITED GOVERNMENT POWER
In 1816, Spain's Argentine colonies declared their indepen-
dence, although the various provinces soon clashed over whether
the national government should centralize its power in Buenos
Aires or grant greater autonomy to the interior provinces under a
federal system.' After years of internal strife, fighting finally sub-
sided in 1829 due to a military takeover by Juan Manuel de
Rosas.' While Rosas is credited by some with stabilizing, uniting,
and modernizing Argentina, his ruthless dictatorship ignored con-
stitutionalism and the rule of law.' In 1852, a rebellion finally
deposed Rosas.4 After the dictatorship's abuses, the rebel leaders
wanted a democratic government.5 In 1853, they promulgated a
national constitution6 that was rarely amended and would survive
several coups to remain in effect into the 21st Century and pre-
sent-day Argentina.'
Argentina's constitutional framers created a civil law system'
that incorporated numerous elements from the United States
Constitution and its common law system.' The Federal Republic
now encompasses 23 provinces and a capital district in Buenos
Aires."0 Federal legislative powers are vested in a Congress con-
sisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives.1' The federal
judiciary has a decentralized system of judicial review whereby a
Supreme Court and lower courts hold the power to assess the con-
1. DANIEL K. LEWIS, THE HISTORY OF ARGENTINA 38-43 (Frank W. Thackeray &
John E. Findling, eds., Greenwood Press 2001); see also generally DAVID ROCK,
ARGENTINA 1516-1987: FROM SPANISH COLONIZATION TO ALFONSIN 79-104 (University
of California 1987) (1985).
2. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 43-47.
3. See id. See also ROCK, supra note 1, at 104-06; CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO,
RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 47 (Yale University 1996) (hereinafter NINO, TRIAL); Juan
Manuel de Rosas, The Caudillo's Order, in THE ARGENTINA READER: POLITICS,
CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 75, 78 (Gabriela Nouzeilles & Graciela Montaldo eds., 2002).
4. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 48-49.
5. See id. at 49.
6. CONST. ARG. (1853), available at http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/
SirveObras/06921841222858395209079/index.htm (last visited June 15, 2008).
7. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 48-49.
8. See REBECCA BILL CHAVEZ, THE RULE OF LAW IN NASCENT DEMOCRACIES:
JUDICIAL POLITICS IN ARGENTINA 13, 43 (Stanford University Press 2004).
9. See id. at 13, 30.
10. State of Argentina, Provinces, http://www.argentina.gov.ar/argentina/portal/
paginas.dhtml?pagina=425 (last visited June 15, 2008).
11. See CHAVEZ, supra note 8, at 30, 42-43.
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stitutionality of laws and decrees.12
The Argentine political system is extremely centralized. The
federal government has always dominated provincial and munici-
pal governments, and Buenos Aires has dominated the interior
provinces.13 "Within the federal government itself, power has
been concentrated in the presidency at the expense of the legisla-
tive and judicial branches. The result has been a hyperpresidential
system." 4 While the power of military dictatorships obviously
rested almost entirely with the federal executive, executive
hegemony has also been a characteristic of civilian regimes.
Hyperpresidentialism largely stems from the constitution
itself, which was influenced by the writings of Juan Bautista
Alberdi (1810-84). 15 Alberdi wanted a constitution that would
finally bring stability to Argentina, which had been torn apart by
several civil wars since its independence in 1816.16 Lawlessness
often prevailed since many regions were governed by caudillos,
regional warlords or leaders. 7 Prior attempts at constitutional
rule had utterly failed. 8 The fall of Rosas' dictatorship in 1852
had led to a resurgence of conflicts and skirmishes between the
relatively isolated interior provinces and the far wealthier Buenos
Aires province, as all of these provinces sought more power and
autonomy, if not outright secession. 9 Obsessed by the lack of a
unitary government, 20 Alberdi thought that a strong presidential
regime would finally stabilize the country:
21
[Alberdi] believed that Argentine history demanded an
elected king, a government democratic in its origin but not
in its exercise. Accordingly, the constitution granted to the
president the following powers which are absent in its
American counterpart: appointment of cabinet members
and other executive officials without Senate confirmation;
unilateral enactment of state-of-siege legislation when Con-
gress is in recess; the ability to detain and displace people
during a state of siege; and, arguably, the ability to remove
12. Id. at 43.
13. NINO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 48-49.
14. Id. at 49.
15. Id.; PABLO LucAs VERDO, ALBERDI: Su VIGENCIA Y MODERNIDAD
CONSTITUCIONAL 14, 48 (1998); see also NINO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 49.
16. VERDfJ, supra note 15, at 12; see also LEwis, supra note 1, at 41-49.
17. VERDO, supra note 15, at 12; RocK, supra note 1, at 448.
18. Id.
19. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 116, 121-22.
20. VERDO, supra note 15, at 52.
21. See NINO, TRIfAL, supra note 3, at 49.
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elected provincial authorities during periods of internal or
external strife.22
In addition to these broad ordinary and emergency constitu-
tional powers, presidents have assumed a host of powers not
granted by the constitution itself.23 For example, presidents
assume many ordinary legislative duties.24 They can also formally
override laws passed by the legislature if the issues involve
"necessity and urgency."25 They can suspend constitutional rights
by declaring a state of siege. They have line-item veto power
over congressional enactments.27 They can pardon defendants
who are on trial and not yet convicted.2" When Congress is not in
session, the president is empowered to conduct "federal interven-
tions" by dissolving the provincial administrations and ruling over
the provinces pending the election of new authorities,29 a proce-
dure frequently used for partisan reasons to oust provincial gov-
ernments opposing the president.0
Presidential omnipotence has failed to stabilize Argentina,
which endured military coups in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1966, and
1976,31 and which saw two elected presidents, Alfonsin in 1989
and De la Rda in 2001, resign before the end of their terms due to
significant public pressure.2 Hyperpresidentialism may have con-
tributed to certain political actors' belief that the only way to
achieve change is to substitute the omnipotent president when he
proves unable to resolve a political or economic crisis. 3 Paradoxi-
cally, Alberdi had sought to advance limited government power,
the preeminence of the individual over the government, human





26. RocK, supra note 1, at 124.
27. NINO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 49.
28. Id.
29. See RoCK, supra note 1, at 124.
30. See id. at 126-27, 155, 189, 199-200, 207, 250; see also LEWIs, supra note 1, at
67.
31. See infra Part IV.A. In addition, several coup attempts failed to topple
incumbent regimes, such as those in September 1951, June 1955, June 1956, and
December 1975. See RocK, supra note 1, at 304-05, 315-17, 336, 366.
32. See infra Parts V.B, VI.C.
33. See CARLOS NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 175-80
(Yale University Press 1996) [hereinafter "NINO, CONSTITUTION"].
34. VERDfI, supra note 15, at 59, 62.
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mately contributed to the gross violation of all these principles by
facilitating autocratic rule, repression, and corruption.
Hyperpresidentialism is at odds with what I term the consti-
tutional ideal of limited government power. A driving rationale
for constitutionalism is that unlimited government power is a
source of oppression and political instability. A system of funda-
mental constitutional laws is therefore needed to limit govern-
ment power and establish orderly processes of governance.
Naturally, constitutionalism is a complex concept with numerous
other underlying and competing justifications. However, I focus
on limited government power because the power of Argentine
presidents has been mostly unchecked throughout history.
The constitutional ideal of limited government power is inter-
twined with the principle of the rule of law, which entails far more
than a government merely ruling according to the law, as certain
laws are inimical to the notion of a constitutional democracy. For
instance, from Nazi Germany to Argentina, authoritarian regimes
historically repressed political dissent through a host of laws.
Authoritarian rule nonetheless differs from the rule of law, char-
acterized by "the preservation of some fundamental legal rules
which limit at any point what a particular government, be it dem-
ocratic or not, can do."35 Procedures must also be available for
interested persons to test the legality of governmental action and
have an appropriate remedy for a violation.3 6 A democratic gov-
ernment is therefore never supposed to be omnipotent and above
the law.
Limits can be achieved by diffusing the government's power
among separate institutions. As noted by Montesquieu in The
Spirit of the Laws, merging executive, legislative, and judicial
powers into the presidency is a recipe for tyranny.37 The legisla-
ture and judiciary must therefore have sufficient independence to
serve as institutional counter-powers against the executive.
Further, the government must respect certain inalienable
human rights. While listing each important individual right and
the substantive justifications for its existence is beyond the scope
of this article, fundamental rights include the freedom from
imprisonment without due process of law, liberty of thought,
expression, and protest. The Argentine Constitution provides
35. NINO, CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 3.
36. See CHAvtz, supra note 8, at 10.
37. Nno, CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 3.
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these rights,38 although they were grossly violated by political
repression until the democratic transition of 1983. This article
will subsequently examine constitutionalism and the rule of law
since the constitution's promulgation in 1853, illustrating how
Argentina has been a country ruled largely by omnipotent individ-
uals rather than by laws.39
III. 1860-1930: DEMOCRATIZATION
DURING THE GOLDEN AGE
From 1860 to 1930, Argentina was mostly stable and one of
the world's richest countries due to a prosperous economy that
relied largely on exports of wool, wheat, and beef.40 But the
wealth of Argentina's "Golden Age" was concentrated in Buenos
Aires while "[t]he interior, central to Argentina in the colonial
period, became increasingly distant from Buenos Aires and the
Pampa region in economic, social, and political terms."41 The ben-
efits of economic development were mostly enjoyed by a small,
wealthy elite that controlled the economy and governed the coun-
try while the working class remained poor and voiceless."
Meanwhile, the persecution of Argentina's original inhabi-
tants continued. Spanish colonization already had ravaged the
Indian population, which was depleted by at least 10% due to
exposure to European diseases and the brutal and slavish condi-
tions of forced labor. 3 After Argentina attained independence,
both Rosas' dictatorship44 and the succeeding democratic govern-
ment conducted genocidal campaigns to massacre the few remain-
ing recalcitrant Indian tribes. 5 The democratic government also
coerced some Indians into signing grossly unfair treaties that
waived rights to their land in exchange for material goods of com-
paratively derisory value that often were not even delivered to the
38. See, e.g., CONST. ARG. arts. 14, 19, 33.
39. CHAvi z, supra note 8, at 5.
40. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 53-71.
41. Id. at 70-71.
42. See id. at 66-67, 70-71.
43. See id. at 20-23; Claudia Lozano, Indigenous People, Rights, and the State in
Argentina, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 603, 610-11 (2005).
44. See Charles Darwin, Wars of Extermination, in THE ARGENTINA READER:
POLITICS, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 115 (Gabriela Nouzeilles & Graciela Montaldo eds.,
2002).
45. See generally David Vifias, The Foundation of the National State, in THE
ARGENTINA READER: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 161 (Gabriela Nouzeilles &
Graciela Montaldo eds., 2002).
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Indians. 46 Much of the relatively small remaining Indian popula-
tion gradually became assimilated into the mainstream Argentine
population due to interracial mixing.
47
The enactment of the Constitution in 1853 had made Argen-
tina a democracy in name only, as lawlessness, corruption, and
repression persisted. While the Constitution instituted demo-
cratic elections, the ruling elite manipulated the electoral process
to serve its interests. 48 Even though an independent Supreme
Court technically prohibited political repression,49 government
agents commonly harassed opposition candidates. 0 The fear of
reprisals dissuaded the electorate from backing the opposition
since ballots were not confidential and voters often had to tell elec-
tion monitors for whom they wanted to vote. 1 Parties occasionally
rigged the balloting, although the abysmal voter turnout usually
made systematic fraud unnecessary. 2 Most registered voters did
not bother to vote.53 The law also formally disenfranchised women
and the rapidly growing European immigrant population despite
the fact that these groups combined to form a substantial portion
of the country's population.54 In particular, Argentina's economic
expansion had led to a surge in immigration. 5 Between 1871 and
1914, nearly 6 million immigrants had arrived in Argentina, 3
million of whom settled. Half of them came from Italy and a
quarter from Spain. 57 "Between 1850 and 1930, fewer than 5% of
immigrants took Argentine citizenship," thereby remaining disen-
franchised. 8 Immigrants generally had little interest in becoming
Argentine citizens, partly to avoid compulsory military service 9
and partly because of the cumbersome naturalization
procedures. 0
46. See Chief Manuel Namuncurd, Letter to the President, in THE ARGENTINA
READER: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 154 (Gabriela Nouzeilles & Graciela
Montaldo eds., 2002).
47. See Lozano, supra note 43, at 610-16.
48. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 66-67.
49. See CHAV9z, supra note 8, at 42-43.
50. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 67.
51. See id. at 67; see generally ROCK, supra note 1, at 129.
52. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 67.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 67.
55. See id. at 53-55.
56. ROCK, supra note 1, at 141, 166-67.
57. See id. at 141.
58. Id. at 143.
59. Id. at 143, 188
60. See id. at 190.
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All of these problems enabled political parties to merely cater
to a politically active oligarchic elite.61 Nevertheless, by 1889, sig-
nificant opposition to the government had mounted in the Uni6n
Civica Nacional, known as the Radical Party, thereby forcing the
Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN), the ruling conservative
party, to systematically rig and overturn elections to stay in
power.62 The Radicals retaliated by withdrawing from the electo-
ral process and urging their numerous adherents to vote "in
blank" to protest electoral fraud while showing their principled
support for the electoral system.13 Meanwhile, anarchist and
socialist opposition groups gained in popularity, although the
Radical Party remained the main opposition group.'
The rise of opposition forces contributed to the belief of many
moderates within the oligarchy that democratizing the political
system would be necessary to avoid social upheaval, as well as
contain and control social change. 5 The moderates' amenability
to reform was also inspired by the winds of change emanating
from European countries moving towards popular democracy.66
In 1911, the PAN finally conceded to major reforms in the
electoral system by allowing universal male suffrage, secret bal-
loting, and other measures to reduce fraud.67 Voting became
mandatory,6" which led voter turnout to surge to approximately
70-80%.69 Smaller parties and the opposition at large were rela-
tively empowered, as parliamentary elections would now guaran-
tee a third of the seats to the leading runner-ups in each
jurisdiction." Yet, "women remained disenfranchised"71 and no
reforms were made to bring immigrants into the citizenry and the
electorate.72
In 1916, Hip6lito Yrigoyen of the Radical Party was eventu-
ally voted president while the PAN's candidate finished a distant
61. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 66-7.
62. See id. at 74-5. Argentina's Radical Party is not "radical" in the sense
understood in American politics, as it distances itself from communism or Trotskyism.
Rather, the party essentially has a social democrat and civil libertarian position.
63. Id. at 75.
64. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 186-88.
65. See id. at 184-85.
66. See id.
67. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 76-77; ROCK, supra note 1, at 189.
68. See NINO, CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 156; RocK, supra note 1, at 189.
69. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 190.
70. See id. at 189.
71. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 77; see also ROCK, supra note 1, at 189.
72. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 190.
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second.7" The PAN's ousting came to the surprise of its moderate
faction since it had backed the electoral reforms with the expecta-
tion that the PAN would be able to remain in power by gathering
popular support from the electorate.74 The rule of law had
progressed, as a relatively fair legal process had permitted the
first legitimate democratic presidential election, which had impor-
tant implications since the executive branch of government was
virtually omnipotent.
However, the de facto dictatorship of a small elite was substi-
tuted by a democratic regime that remained corrupt, moderately
authoritarian, and relatively oligarchic. The Radicals' political
machine relied on patronage by using government funds for parti-
san ends.7 5 For example, the Radicals significantly increased the
number of bureaucratic and professional positicns, which trans-
lated into numerous employment opportunities for middle class
persons.76 Many persons were also granted phantom positions
that enabled them to get paid for work that they did not perform.7
In exchange, those who had benefited from the government's
expanded payroll were expected to mobilize the electorate into vot-
ing Radical. 8
The economy essentially remained under the control of the
same economic elite. 9 The Radicals did not seek structural eco-
nomic reforms partly because their leaders benefited from the sta-
tus quo since they were themselves part of the economic elite,
notably as prominent agrarian landowners." Rather than out-
right structural reform, the Radicals favored redistributing
wealth as a means of improving the welfare of the masses. 81 For
instance, they gained support among the voting working class by
conceding to the demands of striking workers in 1916.82 Yet, the
Radicals' interest in the working class might have been motivated
by their desire to win over a sizeable part of the electorate.83 After
73. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 77-78.
74. See RocK, supra note 1, at 190.
75. See David Rock, The Uni6n Civica Radical, in THE ARGENTINA READER:
POLITICS, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 231, 239-43 (Gabriela Nouzeilles & Graciela
Montaldo eds., 2002).
76. See id. at 239.
77. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 83.
78. See id.
79. See Rock, supra note 75, at 231.
80. See id. at 232-34.
81. See id. at 234.
82. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 201; see also LEWIS, supra note 1, at 79.
83. See Rock, supra note 75, at 245.
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all, the Radicals' limited concessions to the working class
amounted to only a feeble attempt at appeasement that hardly
improved workers' living standards.' Insofar as the Radicals
wanted to make more material concessions to the working class by
improving wages and benefits, they refrained from doing so
because this would have led them to lose the support of the elite,
which opposed such measures due to its interest in keeping a sup-
ply of cheap labor.85 The Radical government further demon-
strated the limits of its support for workers in 1919, when the
government directed the army to violently quell a massive strike
by workers whose living standards had dramatically worsened
due to an economic recession." The Radicals' downright hostility
towards communism and collectivism 7 may also explain why they
tolerated the actions of the Patriotic League, a vigilante group
that conducted terror campaigns against union members and sus-
pected communists.88
In sum, constitutionalism made little progress during Argen-
tina's Golden Age. An elitist oligarchy fraudulently barred major-
ity rule until the reforms of 1911 made the electoral process more
transparent and led the Radicals to power. Although the Radicals
enjoyed significant popular support, 9 they hardly fulfilled their
promise to liberate Argentina from violence, fraud, unconstitu-
tional practices, and oligarchy. The Radicals also proved unable
to meaningfully dissipate social tensions that ultimately escalated
into class warfare between 1930 and 1983. 91 Even though the
Radicals had catered to the elite, the middle class, and the work-
ing class, they were unable to build consensus because of these
groups' diverging demands and economic interests, especially in a
period of serious inflation and recession.2
Between 1928 and 1930, an economic recession compounded
by the Great Depression caused government revenues to gradu-
ally decrease, thereby constraining the Radicals to limit govern-
ment spending. 3 This inhibited the Radicals from continuing to
use the government as a vast employment agency for their sup-
84. See id. at 249-50.
85. See id. at 250.
86. Id. at 201-02; see also LEWIs, supra note 1, at 79-80.
87. See Rock, supra note 75, at 244.
88. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 80; ROCK, supra note 1, at 202.
89. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 203, 207-08.
90. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 80-83.
91. See infra Part IV.A.
92. See Rock, supra note 75, at 238; ROCK, supra note 1, at 215.
93. See RoCK, supra note 1, at 212-13; see also LEWIS, supra note 1, at 83
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porters, which in turn destabilized the Radicals' system of politi-
cal patronage and led to a loss of support among much of the
middle class.' The Radical government ultimately failed to put
an end to the economic recession, contributing to the military's
decision to overthrow the government in 1930."
IV. 1930-1983: A SOCIETY AT WAR
Constitutionalism vastly regressed between 1930 and 1983.
First, I recount how a social struggle between Peronist, leftist rev-
olutionary, and fascist factions ultimately resulted in guerrilla
warfare and massive purges. Successive governments made a pri-
ority of repressing or eliminating their adversaries while ignoring
legal limits to their powers. Second, I suggest that this political
instability may have been partly caused by, inter alia, Argentina's
hyperpresidential system. The president has vast powers and the
opposition has limited means of influencing his governance, which
may have contributed to the military's decision to overthrow presi-
dents who proved unable to resolve political or economic crises.
Third, I examine how the populist governments of democratically-
elected president Juan Per6n (1946-55, 1973-74), managed to
achieve a high degree of popularity regardless of Per6n's contempt
for constitutionalism, the rule of law, and the rights of his political
opponents, whom he thoroughly repressed. An analysis of Per6n's
populism demonstrates why the power of a democratic majority
must be limited by constitutional minority rights.
A. Violence and Instability
Between 1930 and 1983, Argentina was entangled in a vicious
cycle of violence and political instability. After overthrowing the
Radical government in 1930, the military soon allowed elections
but barred the Radical Party from participating despite its popu-
larity." As a result of the military intervention, the political sys-
tem became far less democratic than it had previously been under
the Radical administrations.97 During the 1930s, when fascism
was rising in Europe, Argentina likewise developed an authorita-
rian civilian government that systematically rigged elections to
stay in power. 8 Newspapers critical of the government were
94. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 212-13.
95. See NrNo, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 42; LEWIS, supra note 1, at 83-84.
96. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 84.
97. See RoCK, supra note 1, at 214, 217.
98. See id.
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closed. 99 Opponents were forced out of politics or into exile.'0° For
instance, a senator who had denounced government corruption
was assassinated on the Senate floor in 1935.11
In 1943, the military decided to reassert its authority by over-
throwing the government. 10 2 The coup was led by a pro-fascist
junta that suspected the government was about to abandon neu-
trality and join the Allies in World War II.1°3 While the Radical
Party endorsed the coup in the hope that the military would
reauthorize the party to participate in elections,1 4 the military
banned all political parties, increased censorship, and repressed
dissidents. 105 As a result of increasing pressure, however, the mili-
tary eventually acquiesced to new elections in 1946, leading to the
election of populist military officer Juan Per6n, who thoroughly
repressed opponents of his "revolution" uplifting the working
class.0 6 Per6n was overthrown by the military in 1955,1' partly
because the military leadership believed that Per6n's populism
was upsetting Argentina's social hierarchy and conservative val-
ues.0 8 (Peronism will be analyzed in detail in Part IV.C due to its
importance in Argentine politics.) The military sought to rid
Argentina of Peronist, Marxist, and liberal influences in order to
build a reactionary society. 109 It consequently accentuated repres-
sion against labor union members, intellectuals, and academics. 1°
In 1958, after the military failed to rally public support and
improve the economic situation, it conceded to step down and
organize elections, although it maintained its ban on the widely
99. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 88.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. See NINO, TRiAL, supra note 3, at 42; see generally ROCK, supra note 1, at 249-
51.
103. See NINO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 42. For a host of complex reasons outside the
scope of this article, Argentina kept an ambivalent neutral posture throughout most
of World War II. See generally ROCK, supra note 1, at 238-47, 259. Notably,
Argentina traded with Allied countries, maintained good relations with Britain,
clashed with the United States, and offered some measure of diplomatic collaboration
to Nazi Germany, thereby reflecting the Argentine government's reservations about
democracy. See id. at 245-47, 259. Argentina finally broke diplomatic relations with
Axis countries in January of 1944 after years of American pressure. See id. at 251.
104. See generally ROCK, supra note 1, at 247.
105. See id. at 250.
106. See generally LEWIS, supra note 1, at 99-111.
107. See id. at 110-11.
108. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 314-18; LEWIS, supra note 1, at 108.
109. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 128.
110. Id. at 128-131.
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popular Peronist Party."' Argentina returned to pseudo-demo-
cratic civilian rule that continued to be marred by repression."'
Matters worsened when a hard-line military junta took over in
1966.1" It "dissolved Congress, suspended the constitution,
banned all political parties, forced all sitting politicians in the cap-
ital and the provinces to resign, and closed the Supreme Court.""
4
In March 1969, heightened repression, worsening living stan-
dards, and the closing of factories fueled a massive student upris-
ing in Cordoba, followed by popular protests and violent clashes
with authorities throughout the country."5 In addition, state
repression led to armed resistance by revolutionary leftist and
Peronist rebel groups inspired by the success of the Cuban Revolu-
tion and the guerrilla tactics of Ernesto "Che" Guevara, a native of
Argentina."6 Notably, in 1970 a rebel faction kidnapped and exe-
cuted former military president Pedro Aramburu.
117
The military eventually permitted a return to civilian rule
after concluding that Per6n was the only power figure who could
restore order by unifying Argentina"8 and keeping the far-left at
bay."9 In 1973, Per6n returned from his eighteen-year exile and
ultimately won the presidency with a substantial 62% of the
vote. 2 ° Yet, he had moved further to the right over the years,
alienating many supporters. 2' For instance, he ordered the police
to raid the offices of the Peronist Youth, which had served as a
bridge between Peronism and the leftist guerrilla movement.
2
After Per6n suddenly died of a heart attack on July 1, 1974, ter-
rorism, kidnappings, and assassinations by both guerrillas and
their right-wing opponents escalated.
12 3
In 1976, the military overthrew the Peronist government.'24
After even Per6n had proved incapable of halting the country's fall
into violent anarchy, the most radical fascist military faction
111. ROCK, supra note 1, at 336-37; see also LEWIS, supra note 1, at 115.
112. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 337-46.
113. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 127-28; ROCK, supra note 1, at 346-47.
114. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 127-28.
115. See id. at 128-31; ROCK, supra note 1, at 349-51.
116. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 138-39; see also ROCK, supra note 1, at 352-56.
117. ROCK, supra note 1, at 352-53.
118. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 132.
119. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 360.
120. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 136.
121. See id. at 137-40; see also ROCK, supra note 1, at 362.
122. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 140.
123. See id. at 138-42; ROCK, supra note 1, at 362-63.
124. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 143-44; see also NINO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 54.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:3
unleashed a campaign of repression, torture, assassination, and
intimidation to finally eliminate communists, leftists, and "sub-
versives. 121 An estimated 30,000 people "disappeared"126 during
the Dirty War (1975-81).127 Many were tortured in secret prisons
or killed by being thrown out of airplanes over the sea.128 The
purges and intimidation tactics targeted anyone suspected of dis-
sent.129 Rebel groups retaliated with periodic assassinations and
bombings, yet their ranks were rapidly decimated.13 ° In private
conversations, top military officers argued that the purges would
be justified if only 5% of all victims were actual rebels.1 31 Indeed,
the vast majority of victims were not guerillas or violent sedition-
ists. 13 The junta's brutish purges even targeted community activ-
ists for the disabled, and teenagers who had campaigned for better
school facilities.133 A third of all victims were women.3 Among
them were pregnant women who were kidnapped and killed after
giving birth, as part of a plot whereby infants were forcibly taken
from their parents and secretly adopted by families connected to
the junta.135
The junta nonetheless ultimately tolerated certain peaceful
protests. In particular, Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (Mothers
of the Plaza de Mayo) started conducting weekly silent marches in
April 1977 to denounce their loved ones' disappearances. 136 Due to
the group's international exposure, peaceful approach, and female
membership, a massive crackdown would have only further
eroded the junta's dismal image.'37 Instead, the junta resigned
itself to attacking the group in the press, as well as intimidating,
assaulting, and assassinating certain members.3 ' But the
125. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 143-46; see generally NINO, TRLAL, supra note 3, at
45.
126. Spain's Uncharted Foray Into World Justice, EL PAfS (English version), Dec.
22, 2005.
127. See generally LEWIS, supra note 1, at 143-50.
128. NINO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 54.
129. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 143-44; see also ROCK, supra note 1, at 395.
130. See NINO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 57.
131. Id. at 56.
132. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 368.
133. Id. at 395.
134. Id.
135. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 176-77; Rocx, supra note 1, at 386; see also Roger
Cohen, Lost Children, Lost Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, at (PLEASE INSERT
PAGE NUMBER AND, IF NECESSARY, MENTION THAT IT IS AN OP-ED); Jorge
Marirrodriga, Un Torturador En Madrid, EL PAS, Dec. 27, 2006, at 64
136. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 148-49.
137. See id.
138. See id.; NInO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 59.
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Mothers resolutely continued their compelling demonstrations.139
Moreover, international pressure led the junta to allow the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights to do an inspection in
1979.14° The Commission's ensuing report condemned the junta's
abuses.41
In 1982, the junta sought to rally the country around the flag
by invading the Falkland Islands, which had been forcefully
seized from Argentina by Great Britain in 1833.142 While the inva-
sion initially proved vastly popular, public support withered as a
British counter-attack forced Argentine troops to surrender
within two months. 43 The Falklands fiasco gave impetus to the
opposition, and anarchized Argentina's armed forces, which were
already split into rival factions.14 The military finally conceded to
organize competitive elections in 1983.141
Accordingly, Argentina was a society at war between 1930
and 1983. To dominate or eliminate their adversaries, successive
governments placed themselves far above the law. Democracy,
constitutionalism, and the rule of law could only regress under
these circumstances, although it is probable that Argentina's
hyperpresidential system contributed to this instability.
B. Hyperpresidentialism as a Contributing Cause to
Political Instability
The political instability that plagued Argentina between 1930
and 1983 was unequivocally the product of the aforementioned
social and ideological conflict. However, hyperpresidentialism
likely contributed to this instability. According to Carlos Nino,
Argentina's political instability is the product of its rigid presiden-
tial system.4 6 The president is directly elected by the people. 47
Even though the president heads the government, the legislative
branch cannot remove him from office, except through an
extremely difficult impeachment procedure.4 4 This allows the
139. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 148-49.
140. NINo, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 60.
141. See id.
142. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 146-47.
143. Id. at 147-50; MARcos NovARO & VICENTE PALERMO, LA HISTORIA RECIENTE:
ARGENTINA EN DEMOCRACIA 37-38 (2004); see generally ROCK, supra note 1, at 377-83.
144. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 147-50; see also NovARo & PALERMO, supra note
143, at 37-38.
145. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 150.
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president to continue to govern until his term ends even after he
has lost popular support, although the president seriously risks
being toppled by a coup if the opposition considers him to be inept
in governing the country or resolving a crisis. 149  Thus, Nino
argues for a parliamentary system where the government would
be headed by a prime minister who would be directly accountable
to the legislative branch, which could demote him if his perform-
ance was deemed unsatisfactory.50 However, Argentina's Consti-
tution does not permit such adaptation.' The president's
expansive powers allow him to govern nearly unilaterally.152 The
opposition has little ability to influence his governance and may
therefore believe that overthrowing the president is the only
meaningful way to effect change.'53
While political instability is not necessarily inherent to presi-
dential systems in general, 54 hyperpresidentialism in Argentina
may have contributed to the military's decision to overthrow presi-
dents who proved unable to resolve political or economic crises
despite their expansive executive powers. 155 Indeed, military
intervention became a significant part of political life, and was
sometimes supported by the public as a necessary measure. 56 For
instance, Radical President Yrigoyen's inability to resolve a dire
149. See id.




154. For instance, the United States has a relatively strong presidential system,
although the government has never been toppled by a coup and the country's lone
civil war was in the Nineteenth Century. Yet, Argentine presidents have historically
had far greater power than American presidents, who are often checked by the
legislative and judiciary branches. Whereas the parliamentarism demanded by Nino
would not be a panacea, a stronger Congress could increase the separation of powers
in Argentina. A noteworthy study by Professor Fred W. Riggs suggests that Latin
American and Third World countries that have adopted parliamentary constitutions
have been far more stable and less prone to military coups than Latin American and
Third World countries that have adopted presidential constitutions. Carlos Nino,
Transition to Democracy, Corporatism and Presidentialism with Special Reference to
Latin America, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 240 (VImKI C. JACKSON & MARK
TUSHNET, eds., 1999). However, other studies suggest that parliamentary regimes
have been equally as unstable as presidential regimes, if not more so. See Manuel
Jose Garcia-Mansilla, Separation of Powers Crisis: The Case of Argentina, 32 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 307, 362-75 (2004). Further, the notion that a parliamentary system
would have reduced instability in Argentina has been disputed by Garcia-Mansilla,
who argued that Argentina's presidential system would have been far more functional
if politicians had at least respected the balance of powers and judicial independence.
See id. at 359-62, 375-91.
155. See generally NINO, CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 175-80.
156. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 1, at 93.
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recession caused by the Great Depression led the military to over-
throw his government in 1930.157 Per6n was toppled by the mili-
tary in 1955, partly due to his inability to end a recession. 5 ' The
military installed a puppet civilian government, which it then
overthrew in 1966 due to its failure to end inflation and yet
another recession."' Thus, these coups were partly caused by the
military's desire to resolve economic crises, in addition to the mili-
tary leadership's obvious desire to assert its own authority.6 °
Military intervention did not signify a complete end to the
democratic process. On one hand, moderate officers preferred
civilian rule and saw military intervention as a temporary means
of ousting troublesome or incompetent leaders and parties. 6 ' On
the other hand, hard-liners wanted the military firmly in
charge. 162 As outlined above, moderates prevailed in 1930, 1943,
and 1955, as these coups were relatively quickly followed by elec-
tions and a return to civilian rule, unlike the coups of 1966 and
1976.
Even though a coup is a forceful seizure of power outside the
strictures of any legal and democratic process, civilians were not
necessarily averse to a military takeover, especially if it was fol-
lowed by a return to democracy. 63 Per6n's three presidential elec-
tions were perhaps the strongest proof that many Argentines were
fairly amenable to military intervention, as Per6n was tremen-
dously popular despite the fact that he had himself participated in
the pro-fascist coups of 1930 and 1943.1' The 1943 coup might
have been the most popular, as many observers expected a moder-
ate government that would soon return power to civilian hands. 65
157. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 83-4; see also NINO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 42;
158. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 109-111.
159. See id. at 127-128.
160. Naturally, the civilian governments' failures to end economic recessions were
not the only reasons for the military takeovers, as Argentina had a reactionary
military that had little patience for democracy and was eager to assert its own
authority. Further, the 1930 coup was partly caused by the military's fear of a
revolution by rising anarchist and socialist groups. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 83-84.
The 1943 coup was led by a pro-fascist junta that suspected the government was
about to abandon neutrality and join the Allies in World War II. See generally NINO,
TRIAL, supra note 3, at 42. Finally, the 1955 coup was largely spurred by the
military's belief that the Peronists were upsetting Argentina's social hierarchy and
conservative values by championing the common people. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at
108.
161. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 344, 371; see generally LEWIS, supra note 1, at 115.
162. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 344, 371.
163. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 1, at 93.
164. See id. at 194.
165. See id. at 93.
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Unlike the elections following the coups of 1930 and 1955 when
the military respectively banned the widely popular Radical
Party166 and Peronist Party,167 the 1943 coup ultimately led to open
and fair elections three years later that resulted in Per6n's presi-
dential election.
168
C. Democracy, Constitutionalism, and the Peronist
Revolution
In the aftermath of the 1943 coup, army colonel Juan Per6n
emerged as a charismatic populist who managed to rally the sup-
port of most of Argentina, and especially its large working class.
Per6n became the most prominent politician in Argentine history
despite the fact that his rule was short-lived. In 1946, in a fair
election, he was elected president with 54% of the vote.169 He was
reelected under dubious circumstances in 1951 and then over-
thrown by the military in 1955.17° He was popularly reelected in
1973 following an eighteen-year exile - spent mostly in General
Francisco Franco's fascist Spain 7' - but died of a heart attack
within a year.'72
Per6n was a mix of sharp contrasts. He was vastly popular
even though he was a repressive dictator.173 He was elected thrice
but his regimes were undemocratic. He combined the progressive
ideas of a welfare state, labor rights, and socio-economic equality
with an obscurantist aversion to human rights, constitutionalism,
and the rule of law.
Per6n's rule was characterized by the rewards he bestowed on
his supporters and the repression he meted to his opponents.
After Argentina's Golden Age (1860-1930) had enriched the elite
while failing to benefit the struggling working class,174 Per6n's
"corporatism" bettered the living standards of the poorest Argen-
tines "by nationalizing most public enterprises, commencing a
concerted industrialization process, shielded by high tariff barri-
166. See id. at 84.
167. Id. at 115.
168. See id. at 99.
169. See id. at 98-99.
170. See generally id. at 107-111.
171. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 358.
172. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 136-38.
173. See generally Daniel James, Per6n and the People, in THE ARGENTINA READER:
POLITICS, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY, 273-295 (Gabriela Nouzeilles & Graciela Montaldo
eds., 2002).
174. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 71; see generally ROCK, supra note 1, at 140-41, 160.
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ers, and institutionalizing a welfare state."' He set minimum
wages, limited the length of workdays, mandated rest for workers
on Sundays, and created new benefits, including pensions, paid
vacations, holiday resorts, medical services, accident compensa-
tion, subsidized housing and legal services, and bonuses.176 Per6n
demonstrated his responsiveness to workers' concerns by often
siding with them when they went on strike, such as by signifi-
cantly increasing workers' wages.'77 Comparably, Per6n's equally
charismatic wife, Eva or "Evita", became highly popular with the
working class and underclass because she operated a variety of
charitable organizations.' She also spearheaded a campaign
leading to the enfranchisement of women in 1947, thereby win-
ning over many women to the Peronist camp.
79
Because the Peronist Party was strongly represented in Con-
gress, it managed to garner the two-thirds of the vote required to
convene a constitutional convention.8 ° In 1949, the Constitution
of 1853 was significantly amended in the face of heated protests
from the Radicals and other opposition parties.' The Peronist
constitution made the president even more omnipotent by: i) ena-
bling an incumbent president to seek reelection to an unlimited
number of six-year terms,8 2 as opposed to the prior constitution
that prohibited consecutive presidential terms by requiring an
interval of one term of ineligibility before an outgoing president
could seek re-election for another six-year term;8 3 ii) expanding
presidential authority to "intervene" in the provinces by effec-
tively sacking regional governments opposing the president;' and
iii) licensing the president to declare a state of emergency, which
would officiously allow for political repression.'85 On the other
hand, the constitution was also amended with progressive labor
175. NINO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 42-43.
176. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 100; see also ROCK, supra note 1, at 262.
177. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 284, 303.
178. See id. at 287; LEWIS, supra note 1, at 101.
179. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 287; LEWIS, supra note 1, at 101.
180. ROCK, supra note 1, at 288.
181. See id.
182. See id.; see also CONST. ARc. art. 78 (1949), available at http://www.cervantes
virtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/57973844438460617422202/index.htm (last visited
June 15, 2008).
183. CONST. ARG. art. 77 (1853, amended 1860), available at http://www.cervantes
virtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/01371529455614825210035/index.htm (last visited
June 15, 2008).
184. ROCK, supra note 1, at 289; CONST. ARG. art. 6 (1949)); see also supra notes 29-
30 and accompanying text.
185. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 289; see also CONST. ARG. art. 34 (1949).
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rights designed to improve the lot of the working class, such as the
right to work,186 just remuneration,'87 safe and decent labor condi-
tions,"s social security for the unemployed and incapacitated,'89 as
well as the right to upward social mobility. 90
However, Per6n's corporatism involved sheer political cliente-
lism - defined here as an exchange of favors between politicians
and the electorate that is frequently the product of backdoor
agreements - as he made clear that he expected workers' support
in exchange for these reforms. Following the 1943 coup, Per6n
headed the Argentine government's labor department under the
military government.' 91 After several strikes, he arbitrated settle-
ments very favorable to unions but with the clear understanding
that the unions should accept government leadership over their
affairs, thereby causing unions to lose much of their indepen-
dence. 192 Per6n was thereafter elected president by using unions
as his base.'93 Under Per6n, union membership grew from 530,000
in 1945 to almost 2 million by 1949.194 Yet, independent unions
withered because their members lost on wage increases and other
benefits bestowed on government-approved unions.1 95 The few
union leaders who refused to be co-opted were forcibly replaced by
Peronist leaders under the pretext that it was necessary to reor-
ganize their unions in order to avoid internal conflicts.' 96 The Per-
onist Party's political machine was typified by a quid pro quo: the
government was responsive to the demands of workers, who were
expected to systematically vote Peronist, thus enabling the party
to win virtually all elections nationwide.'97 Per6n also gained sup-
port from the business community, unethically rewarding indus-
trialists who supported his government by giving them a near
186. Id. at art. 37, § 1.1.
187. Id. at art. 37, § 1.2.
188. Id. at art. 37, § 1.4.
189. Id. at art. 37, § 1.7.
190. Id. at art. 37, § 1.9
191. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 96-97.
192. Id. at 97; see also ROCK, supra note 1, at 254.
193. ROCK, supra note 1, at 283-84.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 254, 282-85, 315.
196. Id. at 284.
197. In addition to his self-interested political clientelism, Per6n sought to rein in
the working class to avoid a communist or socialist uprising, as he declared: "If we fail
to carry out the Peace Revolution, the People will accomplish the Violent Revolution
[and the way to avoid this] is to carry forward Social Justice for the masses." ROCK,
supra note 1, at 258.
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monopoly over key markets and lucrative government contracts. 198
His administration was also accused of outright corruption and
bribery."9
Concomitantly, Per6n had no qualms about repressing his
opponents. The regime described Peronism as a revolutionary ide-
ology. 0° Per6n's police state "detained, or forced into exile, legisla-
tors in opposition parties. Some opponents were killed, while
many others were tortured."2 1 Academics identified as political
enemies lost their jobs. °2 Critical newspapers were closed. 0 3
Opposition parties in Congress, already limited by their minority
status, faced censure if they protested state actions.0 4 Per6n
impeached four of the five justices on the Supreme Court and
replaced them with loyalists, thereby becoming the first president
to remove justices for political reasons since 1862.205 While Per6n
repressed his opponents, he used propaganda, mass rallies, and
the cult of his personality in order to foster the allegiance of his
followers.2 6 Schools also had to indoctrinate students with
courses on Peronist philosophy.2 7
Nevertheless, Per6n did not institute a fully totalitarian one-
party state.20 8 Opposition groups operated, albeit within the
bounds permitted by his government. 209 For instance, Per6n was
reelected in 1952 with "only" sixty-four percent of the ballot.210
But Per6n had eliminated his most dangerous adversaries while
tolerating an opposition emasculated by his repression and cor-
ruption. Moreover, political clientelism enabled him to astutely
win over people from nearly all ideologies, ranging from "the semi-
fascist and nationalist extreme right, to nationalist leftists with
socialist discourses.... Because Peronism was a mass movement,
it is possible to affirm that it represented, up to a certain point, all
198. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 102.
199. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 305.
200. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 104-05.
201. NINO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 43.
202. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 104.
203. Id.; see also ROCK, supra note 1, at 280-81, 303.
204. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 104.
205. CHAV Z, supra note 8, at 31; ROCK, supra note 1, at 280-81; see also LEWIS,
supra note 1, at 104.
206. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 285, 304, 307, 314.
207. Id. at 304, 314; LEWIS, supra note 1, at 108.
208. ROCK, supra note 1, at 285-86.
209. ANGEL JOZAMI, ARGENTINA: LA DESTRUCCION DE UNA NACION 253 (2003).
210. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 107-08.
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of Argentina."211 In this sense, Peronism was highly populistic. 212
Per6n's popularity begs the question of whether his regime
was democratic. This was only the case insofar as we reduce our
notion of democracy to simple majoritarian rule; however, I will
argue below that a constitutional democracy entails limits on the
majority's power. Besides, it is necessary to analyze Per6n's popu-
larity within its societal context, as many people may not have
voted for Per6n if they had lived in a society characterized by a
free exchange of ideas. Even though Per6n's electoral dominance
cannot be overlooked, especially since turnout was very high
because voting was mandatory,2 3 the democratic process had been
wholly corrupted by the censure, harassment, imprisonment, and
murder of dissidents by the time Per6n stood for reelection in 1951
and 1973. All of these improprieties made Per6n's electoral suc-
cesses seem more impressive than they really were. This repres-
sion inhibited the opposition's ability to rally support for
alternatives to Peronism.24 In sum, while democracy is always a
work in progress, Per6n's rule cannot be reasonably considered
democratic given how far his regimes were from the democratic
ideal.
Per6n's rule additionally lacked constitutional legitimacy. Of
course, one may argue that the legitimacy of a constitutional order
is derived from the people's consent, and that Per6n's electoral vic-
tories made his rule constitutionally legitimate. Yet, even if we
assume that the electoral process is fair and transparent, voting is
insufficient to create constitutional legitimacy. This is especially
true in Argentina where voting is mandatory, as no act expressing
voluntary consent can be forced.2 Hence, voting is not everything
and majority rule is insufficient to establish constitutional
legitimacy.
Majority rule can actually be the archetype of unconstitution-
211. JozAMI, supra note 209, at 255. Quotations from Spanish language
publications were translated by the author.
212. See ROCK, supra note 1, at 263-64, 267, 277-79. Peron's ideology was also
deeply nationalistic. For example, he nationalized numerous companies and largely
rid Argentina of foreign investment in the name of sovereignty, economic
independence, and the end of colonialism. Id. Propaganda lauding Per6n's
uncompromising nationalism contributed to his popularity. Id. at 280.
213. See NINO, CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 86-93.
214. ROCK, supra note 1, at 305.
215. See NINO, CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 86-93. Besides, the average voter is
more likely to vote according to how a politician will satisfy his personal interests and
moral values rather than according to whether the government is constitutionally
legitimate from a theoretical and scholarly standpoint.
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alism. The union of democracy and constitutionalism is not easy
since the expansion of majoritarian rule may lead to a weakening
of constitutionalism. 216 "First, there is the ideal of a participatory
political process in which everyone affected by political decisions
has an equal say in the formation of those decisions. Second,
there is the ideal of a limited government in which even the major-
ity cannot encroach upon entrenched individual [rights] ."217 Both
of these ideals existed in Argentina since the founding of the con-
stitution in 1853. A democratic participatory process, albeit cor-
rupt, was created for people to elect their government; and the
Argentine Constitution created various individual rights. But
elected governments routinely violated these rights. In particu-
lar, Per6n enjoyed popular support when he repressed opponents
of the "Peronist revolution."21 Thus, the will of the majority pre-
vailed over the constitutional rights of the minority. But the con-
stitution should have prevailed because it is the primary law of
the land.219
The will of the people as enshrined in the constitution should
trump the will of the instant democratic majority. Individual
rights can typically be protected through government self-
restraint or counter-majoritarian judicial review. First, countries
can sometimes attain a degree of maturity where politicians self-
regulate their behavior to avoid violating individual rights, includ-
ing those of their political opponents." But pre-1983 Argentine
regimes direly failed to exercise self-restraint in repressing oppo-
nents. Second, minority rights may also be protected by judicial
review if the judiciary has the power to enjoin the government
from violating individual rights. This can lead to the famous
"counter-majoritarian difficulty," where a judicial body, unelected
by the people, asserts that the will of the elected president and/or
legislature is incompatible with the fundamental aspirations of
the people in the constitution.22' Judicial review can only protect
individual rights when the judiciary is willing and able to chal-
216. Id. at 1-2.
217. Id. at 6 (emphasis added); see also TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 2 (2003).
218. ROCK, supra note 1 at 305.
219. See CONST. ARG. art. 31 (1972), available at http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/
portal/Constituciones/pais.formato?pais=Argentina&indice=constituciones.
220. See GINSBURG, supra note 217, at 21-33. Respecting individual rights can
obviously be a self-interested decision. A politician who is in the majority today often
realizes that he may be in the minority tomorrow, and that unfairly treating the
minority would invite retaliation when positions of power have shifted. See id.
221. See NINO, CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 2.
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lenge the other branches. But Argentina's courts have been sig-
nificantly subjugated to the executive (the only exception being
the presidency of Radil Alfonsin (1983-1989), as will be discussed
in Part V). When presidents routinely sack non-pliant judges and
pack the courts with sympathizers, the judiciary cannot possess
the degree of independence needed to serve as a freewheeling
check on government power. There is an inherent conflict of inter-
est between a judge's duty to be impartial to the rule of law and
his inclination to be partial to the executive if he wants to keep his
job.
222
Consequently, due to the lack of self-restraint of successive
governments and the emasculation of judicial review, individual
rights were often violated with impunity. In particular, the power
of Per6n's majoritarian regime was effectively unlimited since he
hardly guaranteed anyone's rights and could unreservedly repress
opponents. Naturally, this was incompatible with the previously
articulated concept of the rule of law, entailing "the preservation
of some fundamental legal rules which limit at any point what a
particular government, be it democratic or not, can do."
2 23
Per6n eventually sought to license his hegemony through con-
stitutional means. As discussed above, in 1949, the Peronist
Party used its omnipotence to arrange a constitutional convention
that replaced the 1853 Constitution with a new Peronist constitu-
tion that enhanced presidential power.224 But the Peronist consti-
tution did not last, as the military reestablished the 1853
Constitution after overthrowing Per6n in 1955.225 The military,
nonetheless, incorporated into the constitution the expanded labor
rights that Per6n's regime had created.226 These labor rights have
also been preserved in Argentina's present constitution. 27 But the
Peronist constitution should not have been invalidated by the mil-
itary pursuant to a coup; rather, the Argentine Supreme Court
should have stood up against Per6n and invalidated the Peronist
constitution for violating the separation of powers principle by
maximizing presidential authority.22
222. CHIAViZ, supra note 8, at 25.
223. NINO, CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 3.
224. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 1, at 105; ROCK, supra note 1, at 288-89; see also
supra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
225. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 115.
226. CONST. ARG. art. 14 (1956), available at http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/
servletSirveObras/0246169865813561875449/p000001.htm#I1.
227. CONST. ARG. art. 14 bis. (1994), available at http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/
interes/constitucion/diputados.php.
228. For example, the Indian Supreme Court has advanced a "basic structure"
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Hence, Per6n's rule epitomized contempt for constitutional-
ism. In 1955, the military forced Per6n into exile, outlawed all
Peronist activities, and ultimately installed a puppet civilian
regime. 229 Even though Per6n was a dictator, his government
seemed relatively benign and progressive in comparison to the
governments that succeeded him. These governments were gener-
ally far more repressive and violent, as exemplified by the purge of
30,000 so-called "subversives" by an extremist military junta dur-
ing the Dirty War (1975-81).2
0
V. 1983-89: THE INVIGORATION OF THE
ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION
In 1983, after the Dirty War and the Falklands debacle, the
ruling military junta stepped down,231 thereby putting an end to
the most repressive regime in Argentine history and marking the
lasting return of democracy, as the Argentine military has not
overthrown the government since then.
Radil Alfonsin of the Radical Party won the presidency with
fifty-two percent of the ballot, defeating the Peronist candidate,
Italo Luder, who only obtained forty percent of the votes.232 Alfon-
sin's victory was remarkable since it marked the first defeat for a
Peronist candidate in a competitive presidential election.23 3 The
Peronists had lost public legitimacy because many of their leaders
had collaborated with the outgoing junta234-Luder even signed a
1975 decree authorizing the military to "annihilate" subver-
sives.235 Much of the electorate perceived Alfonsin as the only can-
didate untainted by the abuses of the past.236 Public opinion was
also influenced by other incidents, such as the Peronist Youth's
assaults on Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in 1983.237
Alfonsin's presidential campaign had focused on "severely
doctrine holding that no constitutional amendments may challenge the independence
of the judiciary, which is a cornerstone of the Indian constitution. See M.P. Singh,
Securing the Independence of the Judiciary: The Indian Experience, 10 IND. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 245, 257 (2000).
229. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 111, 114-18.
230. See Spain's Uncharted Foray Into World Justice, supra note 126.
231. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 146-50.
232. JOZAMI, supra note 209, at 225.
233. Id.
234. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 150-51; NovARo & PALERMO, supra note 143, at 39-
40.
235. ALISON BRYSK, THE POLITICS OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA 142-43 (1994).
236. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 151.
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criticizing state terrorism and human rights violations, promising
that the junta's crimes would not go unpunished, condemning Per-
onists for endorsing militarism, and promising that union leaders
would now be elected democratically [instead of being appointed
by Peronist politicians] ."238 As president, Alfonsin sought to invig-
orate a constitution that had hardly ever been respected. First, he
tried to end Argentina's "political culture of hegemony," which he
identified as the primary cause of instability. Second, he
advanced the cause of human rights and the rule of law, primarily
by prosecuting the abuses of the Dirty War. Even though Alfonsin
and the Radicals lost the presidency in the subsequent election of
1989, their transitional regime was the heyday of constitutional-
ism in Argentina.239
A. Tackling the Political Culture of Hegemony
After decades of lawlessness, contempt for the rule of law
became profoundly engrained in Argentine political culture due to
the recurrence of electoral fraud, corruption, repression, state ter-
rorism, and military takeovers.24 ° The judiciary wholly contrib-
uted to this lawlessness by holding that the coups were legitimate
and endorsing the unconstitutional laws promulgated by the new
regimes."' Lawlessness favored the development of a political
culture of hegemony. Due to both constitutional hyperpresiden-
tialism and unconstitutional abuses of power, whoever held the
presidency assumed near totalitarian control over other govern-
ment institutions, the media, and, in the case of the Peronists,
labor unions. Hegemonic power made compromise and modera-
tion unnecessary. It also enabled the government to repress
troublesome opponents and violate the law with absolute
impunity.242
Naturally, this political culture of hegemony is wholly inimi-
cal to constitutionalism and its emphasis on limited state power.
The separation of powers is non-existent because all government
agents are subjugated to the federal executive. The courts cannot
stand up to the executive to uphold the constitution and the law.
Human rights cannot be guaranteed because there is no sphere
where an individual can be safe from the government.
238. NovARo & PALERMO, supra note 143, at 39-40.
239. Id. at 40-42.




2008] ARGENTINA'S FAILED CONSTITUTION
However, unlike previous military and civilian regimes,
Alfonsin and the Radicals never had hegemony between 1983 and
1989. Alfonsin faced significant opposition from the Peronist
Party, which "virtually controlled the Senate, held a formidable
minority in the House of Deputies, controlled political power in
the provinces, and forged strong relationships with trade unions
and with many promilitary groups."2 43 Thus, the executive and
legislative branches were not controlled by the same hands and
therefore could, in some measure, serve as counter-powers against
each other. Similarly, Alfonsin did not control the courts since the
judiciary retained a high degree of independence under his ten-
ure.24 4 While certain judges whom Alfonsin appointed to the
Supreme Court were close friends of his administration, they had
diverse political views and were actually confirmed by the Per-
onist-controlled Senate.2 4' The Supreme Court was able to exer-
cise judicial review, as it ruled against Alfonsin's policies thirty-
seven percent of the time between 1983 and 1987.246 Unlike most
of his predecessors, Alfonsin did not seek to retaliate by replacing
recalcitrant judges with docile partisans.247
While Alfonsin's presidential authority was constrained by
the rather unprecedented balance of powers between the legisla-
tive and judicial branches of government, Alfonsin was also chal-
lenged by other forces. He faced a backlash from human rights
groups who felt that too few military officers were being prose-
cuted for the atrocities of the Dirty War.248 Concomitantly, he
faced the threat of a coup by military leaders who felt that the
prosecutions had gone much too far.2 49 After trying to maneuver
through these challenges,250 Alfonsin was doomed by the failure of
his economic plan. Alfonsin had been handed perhaps the worst
economic situation bequeathed to a transitional democratic gov-
ernment in Latin America: astronomical inflation, a national debt
surpassing $45 billion, and the loss of foreign investments, among
other problems.2' He nonetheless improved the economy with
243. Id. at 111.
244. Id. at 71-72; see also CHAVPz, supra note 8, at 30-40.
245. NINO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 71-72; see also CHAV9z, supra note 8, at 30-40.
246. Christopher Walker, Democratic Consolidation? The Argentine Supreme
Court, Judicial Independence, and the Rule of Law, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 745, 780-81
(2006).
247. Id. at 781-82.
248. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 157-59.
249. Id.
250. See infra Part V.B.
251. ROCK, supra note 1, at 391; see also infra Part V.B.
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firm price and wage controls, reduced state expenses, and created
a new currency whose value was pegged to the dollar.252 Yet, he
eventually faced a volley of massive strikes by the Peronist-con-
trolled unions, which demanded a higher economic standing.253
He conceded to raise public workers' wages, although this contrib-
uted to extreme inflation and an economic crisis. 54
By the 1989 presidential elections Alfonsin had lost public
support.255 Unable to run for reelection due to the constitution's
ban on successive presidential terms, 256 he became a complete
lame duck facing absolute resistance from the public and the Per-
onist-controlled Congress.2 57 Alfonsin stepped down five months
before his term ended so Peronist president-elect Carlos Menem
could take office after winning by a comfortable margin over
Eduardo Angeloz, who had represented the Radical Party in the
presidential election.2 8 Thus, the circumstances underlying
Alfonsin's tenure had precluded him from asserting hegemonic
authority.
Nevertheless, Alfonsin never sought to dominate Argentine
society. As president during the transition from military rule, he
played a positive role in shaping the evolution of democracy, con-
stitutionalism, and the rule of law. During his presidential cam-
paign, Alfonsin had roused public enthusiasm by frequently
reading aloud the preamble of the constitution 25 9 and by criticizing
the political culture of hegemony.26 ° In particular, he accused the
Peronists of having reduced politics to warfare and paving the
way for the fascist methods of the last elected Peronist govern-
ment (1973-76).261 He also denounced the violent and undemo-
cratic methods of Peronist union leaders.262 On December 1, 1985,
Alfonsin made his famous speech of Parque Norte, where he iden-
tified the political culture of hegemony as the cause of Argentina's
252. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 152-54.
253. Id. at 161.
254. Id. at 161-62.
255. Id. at 165.
256. CONST. ARG. art. 77 (1989), available at http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/
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political instability." First, he blasted both the far-right and the
far-left for having extremist views incompatible with a stable
democracy. 4 Second, he insisted that Argentina must necessarily
have a cultural reform to remove the toll of misconceptions
instilled in the collective mentality by authoritarianism, intoler-
ance, violence, Manichaeism, social fragmentation, and the
refusal of dialogue, negotiation, agreement or compromise.265
Third, he identified tolerance, rationality, mutual respect, and the
search for peaceful solutions to conflict as the new values of the
Argentine community. 6
Even though Alfonsin did not talk about the constitution
itself, he was calling for the type of political culture necessary for
its invigoration.267 Constitutionalism may be "the governmental
component of a democratic culture" where people have agreed to
disagree and accepted legal and political processes as legitimate
means of non-violent dispute resolution.26 But such a culture
obviously cannot be spontaneously created. Rather, it develops
over time with democracy. Despite Alfonsin's efforts, his presi-
dency failed to impress a lasting "constitutional moment" that
would mark a clear break with the political culture of hegem-
ony.269 His speech did not draw much interest from the general
public,27 ° perhaps because it was remarkably long and more akin
to a scholarly political science dissertation than an ordinary politi-
cal discourse.
In addition, Alfonsin may have had trouble altering the politi-
cal culture of hegemony, insofar as it was the product of constitu-
tional hyperpresidentialism. As noted above, the Argentine
political system's incapacity for adaptation in times of crisis con-
tributed to the belief of certain government opponents that the
only way to achieve change was to overthrow the president.2 ' By
the same token, the system's rigidity made it unlikely that opposi-
tion parties would express support for Alfonsin's exhortations at
Parque Norte. Indeed, Argentina's hyperpresidential system is
263. Id. at 51.
264. Alfonsin, supra note 260.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. NovARo & PALERMO, supra note 143, at 45-46, 51.
268. See Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun, Introduction & Conclusion to
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(Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun eds., M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1995) (1994).
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dysfunctional partly because the central seat of power is indivisi-
ble between rival parties.272 This system leads to a zero-sum game
turning politics into an "all-or-nothing" competition273 where the
president holds almost all the power and the parties losing a pres-
idential election are basically left with nothing.274 Opposition par-
ties, therefore, try to undermine as much as possible the
credibility of the president to diminish the reelection prospects of
the reigning party.275 Legislators from opposition parties rarely
dare to support the president because their party leaders will
immediately shun them, as the opposition feels that any conces-
sions will undermine its chances in the next presidential elec-
tion. 76 The result is a highly antagonistic system stifling inter-
party dialogue and cooperation. Therefore, when Alfonsin
encouraged opponents to foster democracy through "dialogue,
negotiation, agreement, [and] compromise," '277 he did not receive
support from the Peronists, who were closely eyeing the
presidency.7
Nevertheless, the Peronist Party's reformist wing seemed to
agree with Alfonsin that democracy entailed some compromise,
tolerance for opposition, and respect of minority rights.279 The
Peronists' defeat in the 1983 presidential elections had led to an
internal party struggle, as reformists pushed for democratiza-
tion.2"' Antonio Cafiero, a leading reformist, argued that modern
Peronism "is democratic and not authoritarian."2"' For instance,
reformists helped create a democratic primary where Peronist
party members could freely elect their party and labor union
leaders.282
Concurrently, the reformist Peronists criticized Alfonsin's
Parque Norte speech for advancing a "theoretical" and "procedu-
ral" conception of democracy.283 They accused Alfonsin of analo-
gizing the democratic process to the free market.2 4 Instead of the
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Radicals' social, democratic, and civil libertarian position, the Per-
onists appealed to populism by arguing that individual freedom
could not be dissociated from social and economic rights.2 5 The
Peronists would ultimately recover their popularity, and regain
the presidency in 1989.286
B. Developing Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law
Through Human Rights
In addition to tackling the political culture of hegemony,
Alfonsin significantly advanced human rights in Argentina. As
discussed above, constitutionalism requires respect for individual
rights, although no Argentine president put these rights high on
his agenda before Alfonsin. While Per6n advanced socio-economic
rights, he did not fundamentally articulate his populism in human
rights terms. Conversely, on October 26, 1983, approximately one
million people gathered to hear Alfonsfn speak about the impor-
tance of human rights.287 The Alfonsfn administration prosecuted
persons suspected of gross human rights violations during the
Dirty War, repealed the junta's draconian laws against subver-
sion, reformed the ultra-repressive penal code, enacted a law
prohibiting public and private discrimination, and ratified several
international treaties, including the American Convention on
Human Rights, the United Nations' Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, and the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights.88
These reforms sharply contrasted with the wild repression of the
last military junta, which purged approximately 30,000 alleged
"subversives," amid other atrocities.289
The rising importance of human rights was greatly attributa-
ble to the militancy of ordinary Argentines organized in civic orga-
nizations. Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo remained the most
influential group after the return of democracy. Citizens also
formed other important organizations, such as the Permanent
Assembly for Human Rights, which recorded information on
almost 6,000 "disappearances" during the Dirty War. 9' Several
285. BRYSK, supra note 235, at 143.
286. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 164-65.
287. NINO, TRIAL, supra note 3, at 66.
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trade unions created their own human rights committees.292 Dur-
ing the unsuccessful military uprising-that occurred in 1987, lead-
ers of the Confederaci6n General de Trabajo, one of the strongest
unions, refused to meet with military leaders.293 The labor move-
ment supported democracy to an unprecedented degree. 4
Human rights became almost entirely associated with the
necessity to prosecute the abuses of the Dirty War. The focus on
legal accountability signified that the rule of law would grow con-
currently with human rights. However, before stepping down, the
last ruling military junta had promulgated an amnesty law for all
military and police personnel involved in the "war against subver-
sion."295 Presidential candidates had nonetheless vowed to repeal
the decree, especially since tens of thousands of protestors had
demanded that abusers be prosecuted.296 After Alfonsin was
elected, he kept his promise to bring both military and guerrilla
leaders to trial.297 But Alfonsin declined to summarily nullify the
military's self-amnesty law without providing a legal basis. He
recruited the late Carlos Nino, a famous scholar who taught at the
University of Buenos Aires at the time, and other academics to
advise him on the democratization process.298 Nino played a sig-
nificant role in articulating the government's prosecutorial strat-
egy. 99 For example, he explained that because the junta's self-
amnesty law prevented the judiciary from investigating the deci-
sions of an executive that had already absorbed legislative func-
tions, the amnesty was invalid under Article 29 of the
constitution, which prohibits granting extraordinary powers to the
executive. °°
The Supreme Court eventually invalidated the amnesty law
and held that military decrees were lawful only if they were
explicitly or implicitly ratified through constitutionally mandated
procedures. 01 This was a clear sign of progress, as the judiciary
had historically sided with the military. 2  For instance, in 1947
the Supreme Court declared that military decrees promulgated
292. Id. at 146-48.
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remained valid even after the military left power so long as civil-
ian authorities did not explicitly abrogate the law. 3  In addition,
in 1976 the Supreme Court held that the military had the author-
ity to modify and suspend the constitution.
°4
Several defendants were eventually convicted, including two
top generals who received life sentences.305 But these convictions
led to the threat of a coup by the high number of military officers
fearing prosecution, as the government's investigations had impli-
cated over 1,000 suspects. 6 In 1987, uprisings occurred at mili-
tary bases in Buenos Aires and Cordoba, which led Alfonsin to
sponsor a law barring the prosecution of soldiers who had commit-
ted human rights violations due to orders from their superiors.3 0 7
Whereas the law's enactment by Congress averted the coup,
Alfonsin's compromise undermined his popularity. 8
Even before the military uprisings, the threat of a putsch had
probably influenced Alfonsin's preference for prosecuting a limited
number of persons with command responsibility. Throughout his
presidency, Alfonsin was under attack by protestors like Las
Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, who regularly demanded far more
prosecutions, especially because investigations had yielded consid-
erable incriminating evidence. 9 Popular pressure led Alfonsin to
take steps that he otherwise might not have taken, such as
increasing the number of prosecutions, creating a national investi-
gatory commission on the disappeared, and seeking the extradi-
tion of several defendants who had fled abroad.3 10 Thus, the
progress of human rights was largely the product of a grassroots
process where common people had organized themselves to per-
suade the government to broaden its human rights agenda.
The prosecutions led the rule of law to progress in Argentina.
First, there was a general social consensus that the way to
address the abuses of the Dirty War was through the courts.
Whereas past governments and opposition groups had commonly
organized violent punitive expeditions against each other; Argen-
tina had abandoned vigilantism to become the first Latin Ameri-
can country where mass human rights violators were
303. Id. at 47.
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prosecuted." Second, the Alfonsfn administration defended its
position with logical constitutional arguments, unlike past
regimes that hardly tried to find legal justifications for their
actions.1 2 Third, the public's adamant support for the prosecu-
tions reflected a growing popular consciousness that a govern-
ment's power is limited by people's fundamental rights, and that a
government is legally accountable to its people. 3 Argentines had
a sense that the junta had violated its legal duty to respect basic
human rights and that the Alfonsfn administration had a duty to
prosecute these abuses.
In sum, constitutionalism and the rule of law came to life dur-
ing the democratic transition of 1983 to 1989. These develop-
ments were followed by lawful shift in power when Alfonsfn
stepped down in 1989 in order to allow Menem to assume the
presidency after his election.3 14 This marked the first time since
1916 that rival political parties had peacefully exchanged control
of the government,1 and the first time since 1930 that a demo-
cratic government had completed its term without being over-
thrown. 6 In 1989, democracy had survived three failed military
uprisings and inflation skyrocketing at five thousand percent. 17
However, insofar as the constitution had been invigorated under
Alfonsfn, it would be largely devitalized by Menem.
VI. 1989-2003: THE RETURN OF
PRESIDENTIAL OMNIPOTENCE
Hyperpresidentialism, contempt for the rule of law, and the
political culture of hegemony returned with a vengeance during
the presidency of Carlos Menem (1989-99). The Peronists con-
trolled the executive, held a majority in Congress, and packed the
courts with supporters.1 This made Menem omnipotent, espe-
cially given that the Radical Party's opposition had weakened con-
siderably. First, Menem's agenda differed vastly from that of the
far more moderate Rafil Alfonsfn, the outgoing president, as
Menem had no qualms about resorting to electoral fraud and
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court-packing in order to maximize his power. 19 Second, Menem
used his expansive powers to implement a series of radical
neoliberal economic reforms, which ultimately proved unsuccess-
ful and contributed to an acute economic recession that pauper-
ized millions of Argentines, especially among the working class.
32 0
Third, the economic crisis substantially worsened between 1999
and 2001, which led to mass public protests.2 ' Many workers pro-
tested against their pauperization and the neoliberals' dismantle-
ment of the welfare state, which the workers denigrated as an
assault on the social contract of a formerly relatively egalitarian
socialist society.2 2
A. Electoral Fraud and Court-Packing
Menem's rule was largely marked by a series of events that
illustrated his desire to maximize his presidential power at the
expense of democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. In
1994, Menem managed to amend the constitution to be eligible for
reelection,323 thereby eliminating one of the few effective constitu-
tional restraints on presidential power (the constitution had long
barred successive presidential terms by requiring an interval of
one term of ineligibility for office before a re-election).324 The
amendment allowing a president to be reelected was the product
of negotiation, as Menem and the Peronists lacked the two-thirds
of both congressional chambers needed for an amendment.125 Par-
adoxically, Alfonsin and the Radicals agreed to support the reelec-
tion amendment so long as a rider was included to allow new
controls on executive power. 26 While the amendments led to
Menem's reelection in 1995, Menem ignored the new constitu-
tional checks on his power. 327 For instance, the amendments had
raised the Senate confirmation of presidential Supreme Court
nominees from a majority vote to a two-thirds vote.2 But the Per-
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onists rushed a vote to confirm Menem's nominees before newly-
elected Radical senators could take office. 29 This act was a viola-
tion of a statute requiring that judicial nominations be open to
citizen consideration for seven days.3 °
In addition, because Menem did not want his policies to be
disallowed by the independent Supreme Court that he had inher-
ited from Alfonsin, 31 Menem decided to pack the court with cro-
nies, which he accomplished primarily through improper and
fraudulent means. 2 Menem initially forced the Chief Justice to
resign by threatening him with impeachment.33 When the other
judges refused to resign, Menem decided to pack the Supreme
Court with partisans by increasing its membership from five to
nine judges (similar to what Franklin Roosevelt had tried to do in
the United States in the 1930s).3 The law expanding the size of
the Supreme Court was enacted in a secret vote, which the Per-
onist legislators had staged before dawn in the absence of oppos-
ing legislators, while impostors attended the session to fulfill
quorum requirements. 35 Some nominees were also hurriedly con-
firmed by the Senate during secret sessions where Radical sena-
tors were absent. 6
Menem's Supreme Court appointees were virtually all cronies
with dubious qualifications. 37 Nine of the ten justices Menem
appointed had close ties to him or the Peronist Party. 8 Forget-
ting the sovereign constitution and the people of Argentina, one
appointee stated: "My only bosses are Per6n and Menem."
3 39
Another declared: "When there is a case against the government, I
do not rule against the administration." 340 The Supreme Court
gave Menem carte blanche to govern through the use of Decrees of
Necessity and Urgency (DNUs) to an unprecedented degree of
329. Id. at 35-36.
330. Id.
331. Walker, supra note 246, at 784-85.
332. See, e.g., CHAViZ, supra note 8, at 33-34; Walker, supra note 246, at 784-85.
333. Walker, supra note 246, at 784.
334. Id. at 784-85.
335. CHAv z, supra note 8, at 42.
336. Id. at 34.
337. See id. at 33.
338. See id. at 37 tbl.2.1.
339. Id. (quoting Rodolfo Barra, former Justice Minister of Argentina, in a 1993
radio interview).
340. Id. at 36 (quoting Adolfo Vazquez, former Argentine Supreme Court Justice, in
a September 1997 television appearance on Hora Clave, an Argentine television
program).
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excessiveness2"1 While only twenty DNUs were issued by demo-
cratic governments between 1853 and 1983, and ten were issued
by Alfonsin between 1983 and 1988, Menem issued 401 DNUs
between 1989 and 1993 alone.342
The Supreme Court's subservience to the Menem administra-
tion was exemplified in 1993 by the "stolen decision" scandal.343
After the Supreme Court ordered the Central Bank to pay
$100,000 in attorneys' fees to a firm that had helped liquidate a
bank, the Minister of the Economy found the fee excessive and
told the Chief Justice to fix the problem.3 " A law clerk subse-
quently removed the old decision and replaced it with a separate
decision more favorable to the Menem administration.345 Even
though the "stolen decision" was ultimately reinstated after the
Court's minority publicly objected, this episode greatly under-
mined public trust in the Supreme Court.346 Overall, polls sug-
gested that Menem's schemes severely decreased the Argentine
public's confidence in the judiciary, and consequently decreased
the public's confidence in the import of the law.3 7 While forty-five
to fifty-five percent of Argentines had confidence in the judiciary
under Alfonsin, public distrust in this institution sharply
increased under Menem, as a stark ninety-two percent of Argen-
tines had little to no confidence in the judiciary by 1997.48
B. The Failure of Neoliberal Economic Reforms and
the Pauperization of the Working Class
Menem's court-packing scheme had important implications in
light of his far-reaching neoliberal economic reforms. Neoliberal
economists believed that the Argentine government's excessive
intervention in the national economy was the main cause of the
country's economic woes, and that deregulating the economy and
slashing public spending were necessary. 49 Menem effectively
tested the validity of this theory by instituting radical neoliberal
341. Walker, supra note 246, at 786-87.
342. Id. at 787.
343. Id. at 785-86.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 786.
347. Jonathan M. Miller, Evaluating the Argentine Supreme Court Under
Presidents Alfonsin and Menem (1983-1999), 7 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 369, 372-73
(2000).
348. Id.
349. See, e.g., RoJAs, supra note 321, at 115.
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reforms that quickly privatized nearly all government monopolies,
including oil companies, telecommunication firms, power plants,
airlines, and postal services. ° Menem also slashed public spend-
ing, notably for social assistance programs. 5' While Menem
belonged to the Peronist Party, he actually sought to dismantle
the welfare state and state-run economy originally created by
Per6n. By packing the Supreme Court with supporters, Menem
guaranteed that the judiciary would acquiesce to his radical eco-
nomic reforms.352 For instance, Rafil Granillo Ocampo, Menem's
Justice Minister, openly acknowledged this ploy, stating: "If the
Court were to have a vision completely different from ours and to
declare our laws unconstitutional, we could not implement our
political and economic plans." 3
Investigations revealed that Menem's privatization scheme
was rife with widespread corruption, as tycoons had bribed politi-
cians to purchase national companies far below market value. 54
Regardless of the economic merits of privatization, corruption de-
legitimized the process in the eyes of numerous Argentines. 55
Other scandals aggravated Menem's image, such as the discovery
that Argentina was unlawfully involved in the international arms
traffic.'56 But Menem packed the lower criminal courts with pliant
judges who would absolve functionaries and fail to aggressively
investigate corruption allegations. 7
Menem similarly managed to tone down protests against his
reforms by bribing and co-opting union leaders. 58 Menem also
took an uncompromising attitude against unions' demands, remi-
niscent of the stances that Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher
had respectively assumed against air traffic controllers and min-
ers. 59 Within two years, Menem rendered Argentina's historically
strong labor movement almost powerless, as strikes plummeted. 6 °
Menem's economic plan initially led to economic prosperity by
350. See id. at 97-99, 102-03.
351. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 171-72, 175-76.
352. CHAvtz, supra note 8, at 33-34.
353. Id. at 33 (quoting Raul Granillo Ocampo, former Justice Minister of
Argentina).
354. RoJAS, supra note 321, at 104.
355. Id. at 104.
356. Id.
357. CHAvEz, supra note 8, at 42.
358. JoZAMI, supra note 209, at 257.
359. RoJAs, supra note 321, at 99.
360. Id.
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boosting the economy's growth rate"1 and by controlling inflation
through the convertibility of the dollar and the peso.3 62 However,
the reforms had significant social costs. Between 1989 and 1993,
privatization led to the elimination of over 302,000 public sector
jobs nationwide." Private companies were also constrained to lay
off workers because tariff reductions caused them to lose market
shares to foreign imports.3 ' The unemployment rate rose from
6.9% in 1991 to an alarming 18.6% in 1995.65 Additionally, eleven
percent of the workforce was underemployed in precarious part-
time jobs.3 6 Meanwhile, Menem slashed funding for government
assistance programs.167 The gap between the rich and the poor
substantially increased and the poverty rate eventually escalated
to thirty-five percent by 2001.368
In the end, Menem's neoliberal economic reforms failed cata-
strophically. An acute economic recession started in 1998, partly
because the peso to dollar convertibility policy had led the peso to
be overvalued. 69 The dismal economic situation gradually wors-
ened, becoming insufferable to most Argentines, thereby leading
to mass protests against the government. 7 °
C. Mass Protests and the Changing Social Contract
In 1999, Fernando De la Rdia was elected president after vow-
ing to help those harmed by the recession and the state's budget
cuts.37 ' De la Ra ran on the ticket of the Alliance for Jobs, Jus-
tice, and Education, a coalition of the Radical Party and the
Frepaso Party (Frente por un Pais Solidario or Front for a Soli-
dary Country). 72 Despite De la Rida's campaign promises, unre-
lenting fiscal problems and pressure from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) led the government to institute an austerity
program and cut government spending.373 By the end of 2001, the
recession had only worsened and an additional 700,000 persons
361. Id. at 99-100.
362. See id. at 96, 98, 106-10.
363. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 171.
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were unemployed. 74 The national census determined that fifteen
million out of Argentina's thirty-seven million inhabitants lived in
poverty.375 Further, after the economic collapse and mistrust in
the state financial system led Argentines to withdraw fifteen mil-
lion dollars from bank accounts between July and November 2001,
De la Rdia decided to limit such withdrawals to one thousand dol-
lars per month, which proved to be an immensely unpopular
measure.
376
By December 2001, the Argentine public was exasperated by
the lasting economic crisis and the persistent pauperization of the
masses, which led to mass protests against the government that
eventually spiraled into wide scale riots and fights with the
police. 77 Numerous supermarkets were ransacked by mobs of
hungry people.378 On December 18, 2001, De la Rfia announced a
state of emergency.379 But minutes after the discourse ended, the
streets of Buenos Aires were filled by the pandemonium of
thousands of people from all social classes banging pot pans and
demanding an end to his government.380 De la Rda dispatched the
police to charge demonstrators, thereby exacerbating his unpopu-
larity.381 On December 20, militants from left-wing political par-
ties, human rights groups, and trade unions fought with the
police. 82 Even college and high school students participated.
Although the police mainly used tear gas and rubber bullets, they
occasionally fired live rounds.3 s On December 21, De la Rda was
forced to resign.3 85 The week of fighting caused thirty-three
deaths, over one thousand injured, and thousands of arrests.386
De la Rfia's downfall before the end of his term may support
the aforesaid theory that hyperpresidentialism leads many Argen-
tines to believe that changing the omnipotent president is the key
to changing government policy if he fails to resolve a severe eco-
374. JozAMI, supra note 209, at 21-22.
375. Id.
376. Walker, supra note 246, at 796-97.
377. See, e.g., JOZAMI, supra note 209, at 34-46; Walker, supra note 246, at 796-97.
378. JOZAMI, supra note 209, at 40.
379. Id. at 46.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 47.
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nomic crisis. 7 Alfonsfn also stepped down before his term ended
because he wholly lost public support due to his inability to
resolve an economic crisis."' The forced resignations of Alfonsin
and De la Rda demonstrated Argentina's persistent political
instability. Even though military intervention has not reoccurred
since the return of democracy in 1983, instability may persist if
the public believes that forcing unpopular presidents to step down
before the end of their terms is the only meaningful way to achieve
change in Argentina's rigid hyperpresidential system.
Nevertheless, Alfonsin and De la Rda's resignations also dif-
fered from the military takeovers of past years. While the mili-
tary coups had interrupted democracy altogether, the willingness
of these two presidents to step down might be interpreted as a
sign of progress and democratization. After all, Alfonsin and De la
Rfia were not forcibly removed from office. They voluntarily
stepped down, albeit reluctantly, under intense public pressure,
as they technically could have held onto power until the ends of
their terms. Alfonsin and De la Rda realized the public's desire
for a change of government and the need for them to let a candi-
date from the opposition assume the presidency.
Moreover, the mass public protests that led to De la Rdia's res-
ignation in December 2001 stemmed from rising tensions over
Argentina's social contract. The gradual worsening of the Argen-
tine economy since the 1970s marked the decline of what formerly
had been a predominantly middle-class society. 89 Whereas
approximately ten percent of Argentines lived below the poverty
line in 1950, the number had risen dramatically to forty-five per-
cent in 2005. 390 This author's impression is that, in the eyes of
numerous Argentine workers,391 the legitimacy of the new social
order was measured against the legitimacy of the social contract
387. See supra Part IV.B.
388. See LEwis, supra note 1, at 164-65; NINo, CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 178.
389. Sao Bernardo do Campo, Latin America's Middle Class: Adi6s to Poverty, Hola
to Consumption, ECONOMIST, August 18, 2007, at 31.
390. Carlos Escud6, From Captive to Failed State: Argentina Under Systemic
Populism: 1975-2006, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 125, 125 (Summer 2006).
391. These observations are based on an in-depth research project on the Argentine
working class and the "piquetero movement," which this author participated in while
attending law school. See infra notes 412-15 and accompanying text. The research
included a trip to Argentina, where the author personally interviewed Argentine
lawyers, scholars, workers, and piqueteros. See Amy Boyd, Timothy Gallagher,
Mugambi Jouet & Jennifer Lee, The Piquetero Movement: A Grassroots Response to
the Argentine Social and Economic Crisis (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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of traditional Peronism. After Per6n's social and economic
reforms had uplifted the working class, many workers resisted
neoliberal economic reforms that they perceived as a regression
towards less social equality and the pauperization of the working
class, which was one of the reasons behind the mass protests of
December 2001.
While the working class was drastically impoverished as a
result of the recession brought about by the economic crisis under
Menem and De la Rfia, the impoverishment of the common man in
Argentina also happened gradually over previous decades due to
the relentless looting of the nation's wealth by an elite of private
creditors, contractors, and industrialists'92 This elite collaborated
with politicians to control the Argentine economy and embezzle
millions of dollars through a host of schemes, including fraudulent
contracts, lopsided deals that were very favorable to private firms
but disadvantageous to the state, and the government's sale of its
assets to private firms at prices far below market value.393 The
economy continued to rely on such practices under Menem, who
arranged transactions that were extremely favorable to the eco-
nomic elite in order to persuade the latter to support his radical
privatization reforms.394 As a result of this corruption, as well as
the acute economic crisis that occurred under Menem and De la
Rda, the economic elite became richer and the working class
became poorer.3 95 Accordingly, it was relatively predictable that
mass protests would arise once the working class's living condi-
tions deteriorated to an unsustainable level, as was the case in
December 2001.
The mass protests of December 2001 were also caused by dis-
satisfaction with democracy itself, which had ultimately failed to
deliver greater social justice to the masses in nearly two decades
since the democratic transition of 1983.396 Frustration with
democracy is not unique to Argentina, as every country in Latin
America had an elected government by 1990,117 although the
masses still suffer due to persistent poverty and stark social ine-
392. See generally Escud6, supra note 390, at 125-41.
393. Id.
394. See, e.g., id. at 135-37; RoJAs, supra note 321, at 102-05.
395. See generally Escud6, supra note 390, at 125-41.
396. NovARo & PALERMO, supra note 143, at 14-15.
397. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell & J. Samuel Valenzuela, Introduction
to ISSUES IN DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: THE NEW SOUTH AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 6 (1992).
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qualities.39 As noted by Guillermo O'Donnell, "[i]n a sense, the
authoritarian period was easier than the current situation. We
knew then why and against whom we were fighting.... Now we
must find an answer to the question of how to make a democratic
critique of democracy-particularly when this democracy is so
incomplete."399  The reality is that elections alone have not
improved the harsh socio-economic situation of millions of people.
In Argentina, the disastrous failure of Menem and De la Ria's
economic policies reinvigorated popular support for a return to
traditional populism.
VII. 2003-07: THE RECRUDESCENCE OF POPULISM
President De la Rdia's forced resignation in December 2001
was the beginning of a phase of heightened instability that lasted
until May 2003. "Protests and public pressure removed three
interim presidents from office in less than a month-Federico
Ram6n Puerta, Adolfo Rodriguez Sad, and Eduardo Oscar
Camafio. In January 2002, Congress followed constitutional pro-
cedures and chose Eduardo Duhalde, the runner-up in the 1999
presidential election from the Peronist Party, as the interim presi-
dent."400 Duhalde failed to improve the economy and stop the
pauperization of the working class, which caused more public pro-
tests.4 1 In June 2002, public pressure led Duhalde to announce
that he would step down in May 2003, before the end of his term,
following the conclusion of the next presidential election.4 2
Nestor Kirchner became president by default in May 2003
after winning a run-off election against Menem, who withdrew
because a Kirchner landslide was expected.4 3 Both candidates
were nominally members of the Peronist Party, although their
political views and objectives were very different.4 °4 While Menem
was the leader of the party's reformist neoliberal wing, Kirchner is
generally considered as the first true populist to rule the country
398. Id. at 8-9.
399. Id. at 18.
400. Walker, supra note 246, at 797.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 797-98.
403. Kirchner: President by Default, Stiff Test, B.B.C. NEWS, May 15, 2003, http:l
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2981797.stm (last visited June 21, 2008).
404. Peronism is hard to categorize along the left-right political spectrum, thereby
explaining why ideological adversaries like Menem and Kirchner both identify
themselves as Peronists. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, Peronist Party Losing Its Grip on
Argentine Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at A12.
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since Per6n.4 °' After taking office, Kirchner mastered the Per-
onists' knack for rallying broad popular support and riding high
approval ratings,4 °6 while maximizing presidential power at the
expense of the rule of law.4"7
Kirchner's popularity has been largely attributable to the
improving economy, as the economic crisis abated in 2003.4°s
Proving neoliberal economists wrong, at least in part, the economy
prospered under Kirchner, even though he increased the govern-
ment's role in the economy and spending for social assistance pro-
grams.4 9  By 2007, approximately forty percent of Argentine
families had a monthly income of one thousand dollars, which is
necessary for a middle-class lifestyle, up from twenty percent in
2003.410 On the other hand, the gap between the rich and the poor
had increased, and numerous underprivileged persons continued
405. See, e.g., Jorge G. Castaneda, Good Neighbor Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006,
at A31. The perceived failure of neoliberal economic policies to uplift the poor has also
favored the election of socialist or leftist populist governments in Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Ecuador: Latest Leftist President Takes
Office, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at A4; Larry Rohter, Brazil's President Roars Back
to Win Vote, N.Y. TIMES, October 30, 2006, at A6; Juan Forero, Populist Movements
Wrest Much of Latin America from Old Parties, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2006, at A8;
Larry Rohter, Chile Inaugurates First Woman to Serve as Its President, N.Y. TIMES,
March 12, 2006, A16; Larry Rohter, With New Chief, Uruguay Veers Left, in a Latin
Pattern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2005, at A3. Further, in the highly contentious Mexican
presidential election of July 2006, populist candidate Andr6s Manuel Lop6z Obrador
narrowly lost to conservative candidate Felipe Calder6n. James C. McKinley, Jr.,
Election Ruling in Mexico Goes to Conservative, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 6, 2006, at Al.
In addition, Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan president, has tried to rally other
Latin American countries to join Venezuela in forming a political block with an anti-
United States, "anti-imperialist," and leftist agenda. See, e.g., Hugo Chdvez Moves
Into Banking, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2007, at 39. Following his presidential election,
Kirchner favored Argentina's rapprochement with Venezuela and Chdvez, and
distanced Argentina from the United States. Larry Rohter, As Argentina's Debt
Swindles, President's Power Steadily Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2006, at Al.
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Beef, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 4606147.
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to live in marginalized slums. 411
Many workers have sought to resist their pauperization and
marginalization by becoming involved in what is known as the
piquetero (picketer) grassroots movement, which grew out of
Argentina's history of working class militancy and activism.412
The movement is principally made up of workers, who became
utterly indigent after the economic crisis caused them to lose their
jobs, and Menem's dismantlement of the welfare state left them
without a viable safety net.41 Workers protest by demanding jobs,
an increase in public spending for social welfare, and social jus-
tice.414 Their most effective and controversial means of protest is
to peacefully blockade roads nationwide to prevent companies
from trading merchandise and people from commuting, thereby
hampering the economy and the everyday lives of their fellow citi-
zens in an effort to press the government into acceding to their
demands.415
The piqueteros' protests escalated as the economic crisis
intensified. While only fifty blockades were recorded between
1989 and 1996, 104 blockades occurred in 1997.416 In 1998, an
average of four blockades occurred every month.417 In 1999, block-
ades increased to twenty-one per month.418 In 2000, there was at
least one blockade per day.419 In 2001, the overall number of
blockades tripled.42 °
Pickets technically are illegal, as Argentine penal law prohib-
its road blockades.42' State repression of the piqueteros' blockades
was relatively intense under the Menem and De la Rdia adminis-
trations, which arrested and prosecuted several hundreds of
411. Larry Rohter, A Widening Gap Erodes Argentina's Egalitarian Image, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 2006, at A3.
412. Observations on the "piquetero movement" are based largely on an in-depth
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piqueteros.422 Due to their excessive use of force, the police killed
dozens of protestors and injured many more.423 Nevertheless, only
a small proportion of all picketers were arrested, as the authori-
ties did not significantly inhibit the blockades, which substan-
tially increased between 1996 and 2002.424
A possible reason why the state refrained from a wholesale
crackdown on the piquetero movement may be that, after decades
of repression culminated in the rampant atrocities of the Dirty
War, Argentines no longer tolerate gratuitous state violence. For
instance, on June 26, 2002, police officers killed two young
piqueteros in an apparently premeditated manner.425 This inci-
dent was relatively minor next to the widespread state violence of
years past, yet it led to a backlash against the government, as all
sectors of society, including the middle class, participated in mass
protests condemning the killings of these two piqueteros.426 Mod-
ern-day Argentines' lack of tolerance for state violence is also evi-
denced by President De la Rdia's forced resignation in December
2001 after he violently repressed peaceful demonstrators.427
State repression of the piqueteros eventually gave way to
negotiation and cooption. The piquetero movement emerged from
the grassroots and without any political party affiliation.428 But
politicians eventually realized that they could win many votes by
catering to the piqueteros and the millions of people who suffered
429due to the economic crisis. In particular, President Kirchner
mostly abandoned repression in favor of restoring the welfare
state in exchange for political support.430 Blockades significantly
decreased after Kirchner was elected, largely because Kirchner
was able to add many piqueteros to his political base by resorting
to political clientelism reminiscent of Per6n's days - the govern-
ment does favors for loyal piqueteros, who are in turn expected to
support Kirchner.431 Indeed, numerous piquetero groups have
drastically decreased the frequency of their blockades after Kirch-
422. See CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES, supra note 413, at 48-50, 120-
72.
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ner conceded to increase public subsidies like unemployment ben-
efits, housing vouchers, food, and clothes for the poor.432 In turn,
piqueteros have toned down their blockades and generally agreed
to back Kirchner and vote Peronist in all elections. 433 The most
loyal piquetero groups also stage pro-Kirchner political
demonstrations.4
As piquetero groups have divided into pro-Kirchner and inde-
pendent camps,435 Kirchner has condoned the blockades con-
ducted by supportive piquetero groups while criticizing the
blockades of non-subservient groups. 436  Kirchner has further
relied on a notorious spoils system where loyal piqueteros are
rewarded while opponents are punished. In 2004, he fulfilled his
promise to appoint supportive piquetero leaders to government
posts. 437 Notably, in February 2006, Luis D'Elia, a former con-
gressman and pro-Kirchner piquetero militant, was appointed to a
senior post in the Ministry of Planning.438 D'Ela is a controversial
character who notoriously led a group of piqueteros who stormed
and occupied a police station in Buenos Aires. 439  Kirchner
assigned D'Elia to the creation of programs to facilitate the access
of poor people to housing." ° Kirchner also appointed other loyal
piquetero leaders to government posts.44 1 Conversely, Kirchner
sought to repress Rail Castells, a political adversary who leads
the recalcitrant piquetero group known as the Independent Move-
ment for Pensioners and the Unemployed.4 2 In an apparent case
of politically-motivated selective prosecution, Castells was
charged with extortion for leading a mob of allegedly hungry peo-
2006); Interview with Astor Massetti, supra note 413; Interview with Manuela Parra,
Sociologist, University of Buenos Aires, in Buenos Aires, Arg. (Mar. 15, 2006)).
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ple into a McDonald's in order to demand food." 3 The prosecution
was nonetheless forced to drop the charges midway through trial
after witnesses changed their stories.4
Kirchner may have further undermined the independence of
the piquetero movement by administering government assistance
programs through piquetero community centers. These centers
are the hub of piquetero social activism, where piqueteros plan
their protests and agendas, and stage a host of activities, includ-
ing job training, academic tutoring for children, political semi-
nars, movie screenings, and art shows. 44 All of these activities
aim to foster the growth and unity of the piquetero movement, as
well as instill a social and political consciousness of a radical left-
ist bent, which demands a socialist welfare state and virulently
opposes neoliberal economic policies."6 The piquetero community
centers are also responsible for distributing food, clothes, and
other public subsidies on the government's behalf.47 This
arrangement enabled the Kirchner administration to sanction
independent piquetero groups by depriving them of these subsi-
dies, diminishing the influence of these groups due to the loss of
their adherents, some of whom only frequent piquetero commu-
nity centers in order to receive food and other important subsi-
dies.448 Per6n had used a similar scheme to drastically weaken
independent labor unions, whose members defected to govern-
ment-approved unions that were uniquely eligible for wage
increases and other public benefits.449
Whereas the piquetero movement started as an anti-govern-
ment and anti-establishment grassroots opposition movement, it
was largely co-opted into Kirchner's political machine. Even
though Kirchner is not the repressive autocrat that Per6n was, he
hindered the progress of democratic transparency in Argentina by
continuing to rely on political clientelism to consolidate presiden-
tial power.
Overall, hyperpresidentialism did not abate under Kirchner.
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Aside from the expansive presidential powers granted by the con-
stitution formerly amended by Menem, Kirchner's popularity gave
him leeway to govern with a strong hand, and his patronage of
many piquetero organizations co-opted much of the political oppo-
sition. The other branches of government could hardly serve as
counter-powers because pro-Kirchner legislators held a majority
in Congress45 ° and Kirchner and the Peronists yet again hindered
judicial independence, this time by placing a partisan majority on
the Council of the Magistrature, the organ responsible for select-
ing and demoting Supreme Court judges.45'
Several corruption scandals also suggest that the Kirchner
administration did not refrain from bribery in order to solidify its
grip on Argentine society and enrich itself. For instance, a Swed-
ish company involved in an Argentine gas pipeline project found
evidence of improper payments by executives to Argentine offi-
cials.452 Further, inspectors discovered $64,000 in cash in the
bathroom of the Minister of the Economy, which the opposition
alleged must have been illegally acquired.453
Kirchner's sole contribution to advancing the rule of law in
Argentina may have been his decision to support the resumption
of the prosecution of the Dirty War's abuses.454 Since 1998, at
least 175 repressors of the Dirty War have been charged in Argen-
tina with gross human rights violations.4 5 Further, in 2003, the
Argentine Congress repealed two amnesty laws promulgated in
the 1980s.456 In 2007, the Supreme Court also unanimously invali-
dated presidential pardons that Menem had previously granted to
two former military chiefs who had been convicted and received
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life sentences.4 7 This decision was partly based on the ground
that gross human rights violations are ineligible for a presidential
pardon."' Unlike Menem, who used his presidential powers to
favor impunity by pardoning individuals convicted of serious
human rights violations, 59 Kirchner supported the prosecutions
and the public remembrance of the Dirty War's abuses, although
this partly may have been in self-interest to increase his popular-
ity,46° especially after witnessing how Menem's pardons proved
highly unpopular.4"'
Finally, Kirchner made a dubious arrangement that enabled
him to effectively govern Argentina for over a decade by circum-
venting term limits. With presidential elections scheduled for
October 2007, Kirchner decided not to seek reelection and instead
have his wife, Cristina Ferndndez de Kirchner, run in his place.462
Kirchner could have sought reelection since Menem's 1994
reforms to the Argentine Constitution permitted presidents to
seek consecutive reelection at the end of their term without hav-
ing to sit out a term.43 However, given his popularity, Kirchner
expected that, after his wife's first term, he could be reelected to
another term of his own, which would in turn enable her to ulti-
mately seek reelection for another non-consecutive term of her
own, thereby creating a "Kirchner dynasty" with four presidential
terms totaling twelve years.46 4 This arrangement would enable
Nestor Kirchner to maintain direct influence over the presidency
during his wife's tenure. No one has yet achieved this feat,465
which would technically be lawful under the election laws. Yet,
such a ploy would defeat the purpose behind term limits that aim
to limit the influence a particular individual may have over the
government, an especially wise safeguard in a hyper-presidential
society like Argentina.
This ploy is likely to become reality, as Cristina Kirchner won
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466the October 2007 presidential election by a wide margin. To be
sure, "Cristina Kirchner is a powerful politician in her own right,"
as "she has long held national office, being a well-known senator
when her husband was the governor of the remote Patagonian
province of Santa Cruz. 467 Nonetheless, like her husband, Cris-
tina Kirchner has relied on political clientelism in order to
enhance her popularity. For example, in the legislative elections
of October 2005, Ms. Kirchner and her campaign opponent "gave
out appliances such as refrigerators and washing machines, as
well as checks for as much as 500 pesos, to buy the support of
petty chieftains in the impoverished neighborhoods of greater
Buenos Aires."468 Moreover, in August 2007, a businessman with
dual Venezuelan and American citizenship, was caught by airport
customs officials while trying to smuggle nearly $800,000 in cash
into Argentina just a week after the Argentine and Venezuelan
governments signed debt and energy deals.469 The $800,000 sup-
posedly were an illegal contribution to the presidential campaign
of Cristina Kirchner from the Venezuelan government and its
president Hugo Chdvez. 7° While it is still too early to comprehen-
sively evaluate Cristina Kirchner's presidency, it appears unlikely
that it will change the status quo of pseudo-democracy in
Argentina.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since its promulgation in 1853, Argentina's Constitution has
mostly been a dead letter. The constitution failed to advance the
constitutional ideal of limited government power. This may
chiefly be because the constitution was never given a chance to do
so, as Argentina was essentially governed by corrupt and repres-
sive leaders who did not accept checks and balances on their
power. Coups became recurrent, occurring in 1930, 1943, 1955,
1966, and 1976. While military intervention interrupted demo-
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cratic rule for vast stretches of time, even elected civilian govern-
ments were not democratic in practice and wholly lacked
constitutional legitimacy. Indeed, save for Radl Alfonsin's transi-
tional government (1983-89), all regimes made a priority of
achieving their political goals over respecting the legal limits on
their power. In addition, Argentina's rigid hyper-presidential sys-
tem may have contributed to instability and military coups due to
its lack of capacity for adaptation in times of crisis.
Nevertheless, a return to military rule and authoritarianism
is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Since the purges of the last
military dictatorship, human rights rose in importance and a
social consensus recognizes that sheer state violence and repres-
sion are unacceptable. But it remains to be seen whether Argen-
tines will eventually hold their leaders more accountable for their
customary corruption, fraud, and abuses of power.47' Even though
Argentina would benefit from formal constitutional reforms cur-
tailing presidential power, hyperpresidentialism might gradually
erode through the development of another social consensus recog-
nizing that executive power must have reasonable limits. If so,
Argentina might evolve from its current state of moderate popu-
lism into a social democracy akin to those of European welfare
states, where constitutionalism and the rule of law are more sub-
stantive. In the alternative, Argentina might remain a pseudo-
democracy where constitutionalism and the rule of law are virtu-
ally nonexistent.
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